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1  Problem Analysis and Goal DefinitionsPart I Introduction
While the invention of the personal computer in the early 80’s enabled a globalized access to the digital era, 
the later appearance of the World Wide Web resulted in a generalized use of widely distributed applications 
in a global framework. Most digital transactions that constitute the foundations of large scale networks as 
the Internet, are ruled by a fine-grained paradigm where end users or applications interact according to a 
number of communication models (peer-to-peer, client/server, etc.). For example, an Internet user that wish-
es to acquire an item in an online shop will trigger a client application that will directly interact with a server 
application on the merchant side. Whereas this fine granularity paradigm is appropriate to effectively 
achieve a number of Internet transactions, it results in serious deficiencies when it comes to manage or add 
security services to these applications. Is some cases, it might be needed to obtain a concise view of a service 
rather than analyzing the status of a single transaction. Other situations may require the delegation of highly 
sensitive tasks such as the secure creation and storage of cryptographic keys to a dedicated entity shared by 
all domain components. 
The idea of collaborative domains presented in this work provides a structured approach to deal with 
these situations where the intervention at the fine-grained level is not appropriate. In more general terms, 
this work intends to shows how the definition and the collaboration of domains may provide a higher degree 
of flexibility and scalability to the management and security of distributed applications.
This work is divided in two major parts. The first analyzes the importance of domain collaborations 
in the field of network and distributed application management and describes a new management architec-
ture together with several scenarios that have been implemented to illustrate this fact. The second part fo-
cuses on the impact of domain partition and collaboration for providing common security services to highly 
distributed communication infrastructures as the Internet. The corresponding cryptographic protocols that 
constitute the basic building block of the proposed domain-based model are also provided and compared to 
their peer-to-peer counterparts.
1 Problem Analysis and Goal Definitions
The fast spread of large scale networks as the Internet has opened a world of new possibilities to a very vast 
community of users. The development of such networks has brought forward significant problems in terms 
of operability:
• Poor scalability: The Internet was designed to federate a set of military and educational subnet-
works. The present use of the Internet as a global communication tool was not foreseen by the initial 
protocol designers. The World Wide Web as a major vector of the Internet popularity explosion used 
the Internet as an existing tool to facilitate its extraordinary progression. But this tool was not scal-
able enough to accommodate this growth. 
• Sustainability of the core infrastructure: The serious shortage of available addresses is creating a 
significant threat to the Internet future growth. According to the IPv6 Forum ([55]) by 2008 new 
Internet addresses will be extremely hard to obtain. And it appears that this call is realistic since the - 9 -
Part I   Introductionmechanisms and tricks to optimize the existing address space are coming to an end. As a result, the 
migration to IPv6 is an absolute certainty and will bring forward a number of technical and organ-
izational problems that may impact very large populations of users. Never before in the digital era 
has assisted to a migration of this magnitude both in the terms of technical complexity and potential 
consequences for the whole society. Although this topic has not been covered in this work, it is 
worth to be highlighted as a major challenge to the Internet in the coming years.
• Poorly adapted granularity. When dealing with the deployment of widely distributed applications, 
choosing the appropriate granularity is essential to ensure the manageability and sustainability of 
the final solution. A wrong design choice in this direction may result in a number of issues, in par-
ticular:
• Deployment issues of cryptographic infrastructure. The absence of a globally deployed cryp-
tographic infrastructure is often considered as the fundamental reason of the security prob-
lems affecting Internet transactions. The appearance in 1976 of public key cryptography in-
troduced a common ground to facilitate key distribution and management (no confidential 
channel is required to exchange key material). Three decades after this conclusive event, most 
internet transactions remain unencrypted even if basic security add-ons such as confidential-
ity and authentication are essential to enhance the trust associated to widely used applications 
(e-mail, www, etc.). Deploying a domain-based Public key Infrastructure as a means to pro-
tect inter-domain transactions outside organizational perimeters without involving end-users, 
appears as a better alternative to progressively deploy mass encryption capabilities.
• Lack of encrypted flow control. An encrypted transaction involving two end systems within 
two different organizations will transport information flows which are visible only to the end 
systems holding the encryption/decryption keys. As a result, perimeter controls will fail to 
provide adequate content checking and inspection. Potential threats such as viruses, spyware, 
trojan horses and malware of any kind may penetrate the domain borders without being de-
tected by firewalls and packet filters. Organizations may choose to ban encrypted content en-
tering their borders as long as they don't hold the decryption keys to access the plaintext. Giv-
en the very significant presence of encrypted transactions (SSL, Transport Level Security, 
proprietary encryption flows, etc.), this approach may have a serious functional impact and 
seriously hamper normal operations of a number of networking applications. The approach 
presented in this work where domain-based keys are used as a substitute to their end-user 
counterparts allows to preserve the security enhancement provided by encryption without los-
ing control of encrypted flows.
• Adapted view to tackle operational problems. Unsuitable granularity of management infor-
mation increases the complexity to analyze, diagnose and repair operational problems both at 
the physical and the application levels. Part II of this work shows how concise and precise 
management information combined with a suitable domain-based architecture constitutes a 
significant enhancement compared to classic, MIB-based, fine granularity management tech-
niques.
• Inspiration from the real-life model. Real-life relationships between organizations are based 
on a domain-based paradigm where individuals represent their corporations. As an example, 
the signature of an agreement between two organizations will involve the representatives that 
have been authorized to do so. Their prerogatives as individuals are not relevant but their au-
thority to play a specific role delegated by their organizations is essential. The definition and 
collaboration of disjoints domains (the organizations) together with a role-based paradigm 
are centric to the model of real-life inter-organizational transactions.- 10 -
2  Domain Collaborations2 Domain Collaborations
Domains structures exist in various aspects of computing (management domains, security domains, routing 
domains, administrative domains, etc.). Generally, the idea behind domain structuring consists in grouping 
elements to facilitate policy design and application. The first step to constitute domain structure relies on 
the identification of elements sharing a set of common properties from different standpoints (geographical 
situation, functional capabilities, security requirements, etc.) and group them so the notion of domain facil-
itates encapsulation.
Moving a step further from this "static" definition, this work aims at defining a collaboration frame-
work between domains. The nature of this collaboration is based on the domain design criteria. A non ex-
haustive list of collaborative actions according to various domain definition criteria is provided below:
• Management Domains: Domains collaborate to achieve management functions,e.g.:monitor traffic, 
detect network failures, diagnose abnormal application behaviour, elaborate a concise view of a net-
work or distributed application, etc.
• Security Domains: Active collaboration may be needed to detect intrusions from a high level per-
spective. As an example, malware behaviour may consist of a number of application threads extend-
ing to various security domains. Domain collaborations may also be set up to simplify excessive 
overhead resulting from fine granularity, user-based key management. 
• Administrative Domains: Facilitates administration of information involving user - system interac-
tion, such as login administration, system access parameters, backups, etc.
• Physical Domains. Domains collaborate to reduce traffic through well defined caching strategies. 
Analysing traffic patterns and improving caching may result in reduced bandwidth consumption 
and improved response time. Whereas caching functionality is normally performed at the host level, 
the benefits of deploying this functionality at the domain border has obvious advantages since it 
takes into account a wider view of the traffic.
• Application Specific Domains. Complex applications in widely distributed environments may re-
quire to trigger actions that span multiple domains. A collaborative domain framework will enhance 
both the functional and management planes of the application.
2.1 The Internet Routing example
Internet routing is a very illustrative example of domain structuring and collaboration. On one side, IP ad-
dresses are grouped into hierarchical domains in order to better structure and facilitate routing decisions. 
The design criteria for these routing domains rely on functional, geographical and even political arguments. 
The multi-layered hierarchical structure define a set of subnetwork domains or Autonomous Systems that are 
connected together. Two families of routing protocols can be distinguished:
• The Interior Gateway Protocol: which allows sub-domains within an Autonomous System to estab-
lish routing paths. The Routing Information Protocol (RIP), and the Open Shortest Path First
(OSPF) are the most relevant protocols used at this level.
• The Exterior Gateway Protocol: which interconnects disjoint Autonomous Systems. The Border 
Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the most commonly used protocol for this matter.
The above mentioned protocols define how the collaboration is established between different domains and 
sub-domains. Border routers act as domain collaboration entities in order to establish optimal routes be-- 11 -
Part I   Introductiontween end-systems. The nature of information exchanged in this collaboration framework depends on the 
protocol used. While RIP routers exchange tables indicating the best known distance for each neighboring 
destination, OSPF devices distribute (by flooding) so called "link state" packets containing complete infor-
mation about the involved routers and the corresponding communication distances and delays between 
them.
A detailed description of Internet routing techniques is obviously out of the scope of this thesis (the 
subject is covered in depth in [52]) but this example brings forward a number of issues that are essential to 
understand the motivations of this work, namely:
• The approach used to Internet routing was appropriate in terms of granularity. Routing tables are 
exchanged and managed by domain representative entities (coarse granularity) rather than end-sys-
tems (fine granularity). Given the size and complexity of today routing tables, one can easily infer 
that such a widely spread network wouldn’t be possible with routing decision at the end-system lev-
el.
• Routing algorithms rely on a combination of domain collaboration (routing tables and/or link status 
information between routers) and locally computed routing decisions (routers decide which paths 
are better suited according to well defined algorithms).
• Inter-domain collaborations are performed in a transparent way for end-systems that use the net-
work. None of the entities that populate the system at the finest granularity level participates in this 
process which facilitates manageability and scalability.
To summarize, routing decisions benefit from a well-suited hierarchical structure and a domain collabora-
tion model that enable the capability of dispatching packets through billions of nodes in the Internet. One of 
the fundamental motivations of this work consists in mapping these principles of structuring and collabora-
tion into higher levels of a distributed system.
3 Towards Further Domain Collaboration Scenarios
As highlighted in the beginning of this section, domain collaborations models can be extended to other as-
pects of distributed systems. This work concentrates on two main directions that the author has extensively 
analyzed both from a theoretical and a practical perspective, namely the management of distributed appli-
cations and the deployment of secure transactions to very large user populations.
3.1 Domain Collaborations in Distributed Application Management
Early network management protocols were designed to deal both with monitoring - i.e. supervising the sys-
tem state - and active management - i.e. correcting potential faults. In the real world, only the first function 
has actually been fulfilled by these protocols. As it will be explained in Part II, both the information and 
functional model were too restrictive for performing active management tasks. This has lead to a situation 
where human managers discovered system malfunctions by means of network management protocols but 
were unable to accurately find out the cause of the problem and to actually fix it while relying exclusively 
in this network management protocol. Other methods - such as proprietary consoles, remote login sessions 
or shell commands - were used as a means to achieve these tasks. This work aims at bringing forward solu-
tions to every aspect involved in automatic management, namely: a) the monitoring of a distributed system’s - 12 -
4  Contributions of this Ph.D. Thesisbehavior, b) the automatic diagnosis and c) the execution of corrective or preventive actions when the diag-
nosis is established.
Design choices that were motivated by specific requirements of the management of network equip-
ments, such as the computing resource limitations, should be reviewed when dealing with distributed appli-
cations where computing resources are virtually unlimited. More generally, it should be noted that most of 
current approaches for the management of distributed applications have been clearly influenced by the leg-
acy of initial management protocols resulting in a significant gap between the actual requirements and the 
proposed solutions. When the envisaged management solution deals with fault diagnosis and automated 
management, it becomes even more important to reduce this gap.
3.2 Domain Collaborations in Secure Transactions
The need for security in large scale networks such as the Internet is constantly increasing. The enormous 
growth of the user community and especially the evolution of the Internet into a corner stone of the world’s 
economy has brought forward the security needs inherent to a number of sensitive Internet transactions. 
Since this effect was not foreseen by the conceivers of the Internet (some claim that Internet was conceived 
with "insecurity in mind"), the core infrastructure foundations did not fulfill the requirements in terms of 
integrity, confidentiality, authentication, etc. of a number of transactions that are a key to the digital era (e-
commerce, e-banking, e-mail, electronic fund transfers, etc.)
Consequently, a strong research and commercial activity has been pursued in the last few years to 
provide Internet transactions with adequate security features (see Part III). However, the actual deployment 
of Internet security services has occurred in a very irregular way and only in selected domains of Internet 
transactions. As an example, the emergence of transport-based security protocols as SSL has provided the 
grounds for deploying security services in www transactions and other connection-oriented application lay-
er protocols such as ftp and telnet. However, the level of security provided by these protocols is seriously 
hindered by the absence of adequate Public Key Infrastructures that enable the validation of the correspond-
ing public key certificates. Although the emergence of asymmetric cryptographic techniques has suppressed 
the need for a two-party a priori agreement on the encryption key, the problem of securely binding public 
keys to entities remains. The undertaken efforts addressing this problem have failed to provide a world-wide 
adapted solution for this issue.
Deployment of security services at the network level remains quite marginal and suffers from an 
“All or Nothing” effect. This means, organizations concerned by security issues conceive strong internal se-
curity policies and interact with the Internet through very restrictive firewalls or by means of well-protected 
Virtual Private Networks (VPN [93]). Most of the remaining organizations suffer from a complete lack of 
security in their internal and external transactions (passwords transmitted in the clear, no provision for con-
fidentiality/strong authentication, etc.).
In summary, although significant efforts have been achieved to provide an adequate level of security 
to the Internet, the actual results are far from being satisfactory. The fundamental aim of this work consists 
proposing solutions that simplify the design and management of complementary key structures. This thesis 
proposes structural enhancements together the definition and collaboration of security domains to improve 
both the flexibility and the management of these structures.
4 Contributions of this Ph.D. Thesis
The main contributions of this work in the field of management of distributed applications are the following:- 13 -
Part I   Introduction• Provide a detailed classification of the management information. When dealing with complex ap-
plications, one need to differentiate the nature of information that should be associated to a manage-
ment decision. In particular, a manager entity should be able to process data that corresponds its do-
main of authority. As an example, fine granularity and precise information will be necessary to di-
agnose the behaviour of a single application component whereas an abstract view of a whole 
managed system will require concise and coarse granularity data.
• Create a framework for the distribution of the management functionality. In classical management 
protocols, the management functionality is basically spitted between two main entities, namely the 
manager and the management agent. This work introduces a more structured and refined approach 
to distribute the management functionality amongst a set of intermediate entities better adapted to 
the actual structure of the application that needs to be managed.
• Develop topology enhancements based on collaborative domains. An adequate topology needs to 
be defined to properly distribute the proposed intermediate management entities. The suggested do-
main topology has been enhanced with a collaboration framework that allows, on one side, to ex-
change management information at the appropriate level and also establish a cooperation scenarios 
based on trust relationships where domain agents are able to delegate management actions to their 
peers.
The most relevant contributions related to the deployment and management of secure transaction summarize 
as follows:
• Analyse the impact of variable key granularity: Presently, secure transactions are based on what we 
call a "fine key granularity paradigm". As an example, two users involved in a confidential transac-
tion spanning two different domains rely on a "user-based" cryptographic key, i.e. a key which 
uniquely identifies them and that is known (at least the secret part of it) exclusively by them. One 
can argue, that the end-to-end protection obtained by this model is optimal from a security perspec-
tive but in this work we propose the combination of this approach with the coarse-grained alterna-
tive offering significant advantages in terms of deployment and management.
• Introduce a domain-based security model: we study the impact of the domain concept from differ-
ent perspectives, namely: a) the definition of domain-based protocols and their advantages with re-
spect to their user-based counterparts, b) the benefits derived from domain-based key granularity 
for secure transactions and c) the significance of domain collaborations when applied to Certifica-
tion Authorities relationships.
• Refine the role and propose a collaboration framework for Certification Authorities: As the entities 
publishing and managing certificates, CAs as play a fundamental role in a Public Key Infrastructure. 
Relying both on the variable key granularity and on the domain-based model, we describe a frame-
work allowing to refine the functionality of these key entities.- 14 -
1  Introduction to Network Management ProtocolsPart II Domain Collaborations in Distributed 
Applications Management
1 Introduction to Network Management Protocols
The management of a variety of networks and equipments, in general, has been a challenging task since the 
early beginnings of the digital information era. Initially, management was achieved by non structured ap-
proaches that required the physical presence of the manager to monitor the system and detect malfunctions. 
The next step took advantage of the network and used general purpose protocols allowing to login remotely 
and execute diagnostic commands.
The growth in size, complexity and diversity of today networks has resulted in a need for structured 
and homogeneous management approaches. Global design requirements for a network management proto-
col:
• Accommodate devices with low computing resources (e.g. where remote login is impossible).
• Assume equipment heterogeneity: management agents easy to deploy amongst a diversity of net-
worked equipment.
• Assume low bandwidth consumption: management packets should be able to thwart congested net-
works. Moreover, this fact guided the choice of SNMP designers into a datagram-oriented (rather 
than connection-oriented) underlying protocol.
This introductory section does a brief survey of initial management protocols and studies the shortcomings 
of the underlying model for the management of distributed applications. Finally, an overview of existing 
solutions for Management of Distributed Applications is outlined.
1.1 Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
The main objective of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) was to provide a management 
framework for network devices (e.g. routers, bridges, switches, end-systems, etc.) connected by a TCP/IP 
network. The SNMP family as it was conceived at the late 80’s included: a) a datagram-oriented protocol 
ruling the interactions between involved parties (the SNMP protocol, [16]); b) a set of recommendations for
Structuring the Management Information (SMI, [104]) and c) a specification and definition of management 
variables (a so called Management Information Base or MIB) representing the status of a TCP/IP network 
[79].
The SNMP model includes two classes of functional entities:
• the agent, which provides information about the part of the system being controlled (the managed 
object). Agents store this information and deliver it to the management station on request. Agents 
may also issue unsolicited signals (traps) under critical circumstances.- 15 -
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simply display it into a management console or perform finer analysis on it in order to yield more 
elaborated diagnostics.
Agents and management stations are linked by the SNMP protocol which provides the following fundamen-
tal operations:
• get: The operation by which the management station retrieves information from agents.
• set: allows the management station to modify agent variables and thus influence the behaviour of 
the managed object.
• trap: allows the agent to notify the management station of exceptional events.
The collection of management variables that can be accessed via the SNMP protocol are known as the Man-
agement Information Base (MIB). As results from the mathematical definition of a base, this collection of 
variables should be: a) representative of the managed object and b) minimal, this is, information provided 
by one variable cannot possibly be obtained by a combination of other variable values. In the SNMP family, 
the rules defining the variables to be included in a MIB are grouped under the so called Structure of Man-
agement Information (SMI).
SNMP has gone through a significant number of upgrades and revisions since the publication of the 
seminal standards at the end of the last decade. The first stable version was proposed as a set of three RFCs 
([16], [104], [79]) in 1990 and is commonly known as SNMPv1. Due to its simplicity and functionality, 
SNMPv1 had a remarkable success in the marketplace which resulted in a high number of SNMP compliant 
network devices and integrated management software products.
The significant security deficiencies inherent to SNMPv1 together with some performance consid-
erations lead to SNMPv2, which was published in 1993 in a series of twelve RFCs [18]. The deployment of 
SNMPv2 was quite marginal because of the complexity of the proposed security and administrative model. 
This fact, together with important discrepancies amongst SNMP architects gave birth to a number of inter-
mediate versions of minor relevance (such as: SNMPv2*, SNMPv2u, SNMPv1+, SNMPv1.5, etc.). In 2002, 
a new consensus was reached around SNMPv3 ([97]). This version features a set of security enhancements 
together with a more flexible architecture to accommodate complex management scenarios. The MIB-based 
view where management decisions rely on sets of very specific low-level information remains centric to 
SNMPv3.
A more exhaustive description of the SNMP protocol, can be found in [11], [103], [122] and [78].
1.2 The OSI Management Framework
The OSI Management Framework which is usually referred to as the Common Management Information 
Protocol or CMIP(1) is the result of a joint effort of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
and The International Consultative Committee on Telegraphy and Telephony (CCITT). The fundamental 
aim of CMIP was to provide a management framework to the OSI networking standards. The OSI manage-
ment standards ([58], [59], [60]), including the description of the CMIP protocol, were released on 1991.
The OSI Management architecture is also built upon a Manager/Agent relationship except that, as 
opposed to SNMP, each entity may play both roles. It relies on the 7 layered OSI stack and uses existing, 
1 Actually, CMIP is only the name of one of the backbone protocols that constitute the OSI Management 
Framework- 16 -
1  Introduction to Network Management Protocolshi-level OSI services (so called service elements) for establishing associations between managers and 
agents. These associations are connection-oriented as opposed to the connection-less SNMP mode of com-
munication.
The OSI management information model also relies on the existence of a Management Information 
Base (MIB) containing objects that reflect the actual status of the managed system and allow the manager 
to act on it. However, the specifications of the OSI information model are based on object-oriented princi-
ples and this enhances both the modularity and reusability of the OSI information model with respect to SN-
MP’s.
The set of management operations by which managers and agents interact is also significantly richer 
than the above mentioned SNMP operations. These services are fully described in the Common Manage-
ment Information Service (CMIS, [58]); we summarize below the most relevant ones:
• M-GET, M-SET, M-EVENT-REPORT: Allow respectively to retrieve and modify data in the Man-
agement Information Base. Additionally, the M-CANCEL-GET service allows to invalidate a pre-
viously issued M-GET primitive.
• M-EVENT-REPORT: This service is used by an agent process to report a notification to a manager 
process.
• M-CREATE, M-DELETE: allows the dynamic creation and deletion of MIB objects.
• M-ACTION: allows the invocation of a pre-defined procedure on peer MIB objects.
Beyond the information infrastructure and the set of low-level management services, the OSI Management 
Framework and in particular, the OSI System Management standard [60] introduces five (overlapping) func-
tional areas that can be used as a basis for designing a network management architecture: fault management, 
accounting management, performance management and security management. Each of these areas is sup-
ported by a number of system-management functions such as event reporting, log control, security-audit-
trail, workload monitoring, etc. 
These system management functions provide elaborated models that specify the management archi-
tecture that may be suitable for achieving a given function. As an example, the Event-Report-Management
function defines a class named event-forwarding discriminator which role consists in receiving event re-
ports from a set of managed objects and perform programmable filtering and selective forwarding opera-
tions on them. In other words, instances of this class act as intermediaries between classical agent and man-
ager objects and have the capability to decide how event reports are presented and which manager stations 
actually receive them.
At this moment, the deployment of the OSI Management System remains scarce. The significant 
benefits in terms of flexibility and functionality result in a sensible performance overhead and overall com-
plexity when compared to SNMP. Furthermore, the need for a complete and fully operational OSI stack con-
stitutes an important obstacle for those equipments lacking computing resources. However, it is widely ad-
mitted that CMIP better suits the requirements of large and complex network environments and, in particu-
lar, is a better candidate for the management of distributed applications. 
For a more complete description of the OSI Management standards, the reader may refer to [11] and 
[122].- 17 -
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The Telecommunications Management Network (TMN) is a flexible and powerful framework developed to 
provide an integrated solution to the management of telecommunication services. The fundamental aim of 
TMN is to achieve interconnection among telecommunication systems that must exchange management in-
formation. TMN was initially conceived for meeting the requirements, in terms of heterogeneity and com-
plexity, of telephony networks. However, its extension to more generic service-oriented networks and, in 
particular, to so called Intelligent Networks is being considered [75].
From an architectural point of view, TMN should be seen as an external logical network with re-
spect to the core telecommunications network having the following fundamental components:
• The Operation System providing mechanisms for interaction, observation and execution of manage-
ment functions.
• The Mediation Device which provides filtering, object representation conversions and intermediate 
information storing.
• The Network Elements which constitute the interface between the managed system and the TMN 
network (these are the “agents” of the TMN architecture).
• The Data Communication Network: the core network serving as a base for exchanging management 
information.
• The Work Station which provides the interface between the user and the TMN components.
• The Q adapters also called Q interfaces which provide homogeneity of information passed between 
TMN and non-TMN blocks.
These architectural blocks are responsible for achieving a set of functions (so called function blocks) that 
provide the general capabilities of Operations, Administration, Maintenance and Provisioning (OAM&P) 
inherent to TMN.
Another important aspect of TMN is the ability to exchange management information and grant 
controlled access across different types of boundaries (jurisdictional, system provider-customer and system-
to-system). According to the nature of the application, TMN provides two different mechanisms for this 
matter:
• interactive: based on the CMIS service elements described in section §1.2. It should be noted that 
these application services also rely on the OSI object-oriented information model.
• file-oriented: using OSI’s FTAM (File Transfer Access and Management) protocol.
TMN has been developed within the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Commit-
tee (CCITT) and is covered by a large series of CCITT documents. In particular, [19] provides an introduc-
tory view of TMN principles and architecture. These aspects are covered in detail in a set of so called M 
recommendations [20], while the Q recommendations [21] deal with the management interfaces and refer-
ence points and in particular with q3. Other good sources of TMN information are [56] and [113].
TMN represents a significant step forward in the management of large and complex networks; its 
functional and architectural separation and its potential for exchanging information amongst management 
sub-systems constitute an important asset with respect to other management protocols as CMIP or SNMP. 
However, the deployment of TMN in the world of hi-level distributed application is quite marginal, as op-
posed to the world of telephony where the level of penetration is progressively increasing. Both the com-- 18 -
2  Towards a Model for Managing Distributed Applicationsplexity and the difficulties in the standardization process have been important obstacles in the acceptance of 
TMN as a management solution. Furthermore, TMN strongly relies on the OSI-CMIP management stan-
dards and is difficult to interface with SNMP-based management solutions which is prominent in the net-
work management arena. As a result, migration from existing SNMP-based networks remains marginal.
1.4 Current Approaches for Management of Distributed Applications
Most of today efforts to address the management of distributed applications rely on the classical protocols 
(SNMP, CMIP, TMN, etc.) described in this section. 
In many cases, the specificity of the approach consists in an application dependant Management In-
formation Base (MIB). As an example, the Mail Monitoring MIB [69] and the X.500 Directory Monitoring 
MIB [76] designed to respectively monitor Electronic-mail relays and X.500 Directory servers by means of 
the SNMP protocol.
In the University of Geneva, two previous Ph.D. thesis have addressed this topic: Jean-François 
Paccini [94] explored the distributed of management applications by analyzing the granularity of application 
specific information. Vito Baggiolioni [2] followed a more comprehensive approach and considered the 
management of an application as a design criterion rather than an add-on component that monitors the ap-
plication from the outside. 
As of today, the author considers that the management of distributed application is still at its infancy 
and many conceptual and practical work remains to be done. Application management is understood as the 
management of isolated components and not as a comprehensive strategy targeting the application as a 
whole. The next sections of this work elaborate on the issue of distributed application management and bring 
forward new design concepts that include the classification of management information, the distribution of 
management functionality and the notion of collaborative domains.
2 Towards a Model for Managing Distributed Applications
The main objective of initial management protocols as SNMP was the management of physical network de-
vices such as hubs, routers, bridges, etc. An important constraint in the conception of these protocols was 
the low processing power of managed devices. A quite illustrative example, in this direction is the choice of 
a connection-less communication paradigm for SNMP exchanges. This choice has two fundamental advan-
tages over the connection-oriented counterpart: firstly, the bandwidth consumption is lower since the packet 
exchange resulting from the connection establishment and termination is saved; secondly, the managed de-
vice does not need to cope with keeping the state of (several) open connections. Nevertheless, from a pure 
management point of view, the connection-oriented alternative is preferable, especially in terms of reliabil-
ity (provides assurance of packet reception) and security (establishing a secure association is easier within 
a connection). This example shows that certain. 
This section is devoted to identify the design issues that, in our opinion, must be fulfilled by a suc-
cessful automated management for distributed applications solution. These recommendations constitute the 
foundations of the management system that we have built and that will be described in section §3. The pro-
posed designed issues have been grouped in four areas: the information model, the distribution of manage-
ment functionality, the structuring of the management application and the management interactions. For 
each item, a brief discussion dealing with the adequacy of existent solutions will also be presented.- 19 -
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The fundamental role of a Management Information Model (also referred to as the Structure of Management 
Information) is to specify a set of objects in the form of variables that are representative of the system under 
management. The values of these variables provide a complete view of the actual state of the system when 
these values are retrieved. By explicitly modifying these values, the manager may act on the managed sys-
tem. This collection of objects is normally referred to as a Management Information Base (MIB).
The nature of information that should be included in a MIB and the way it must be structured is usu-
ally subject of intensive debates. The SNMP protocol advocates for a relatively flat structure containing con-
cise information while the OSI approach proposes an object-oriented architecture with a level of detail 
which depends on the nature of the system to be managed. Despite the structuring differences, the nature of 
information contained by most of existing MIBs of classical network management protocols can be classi-
fied in two major groups:
• Status Information indicating the actual status of the system (and possibly sub-systems) under 
management. Typical values for these objects are: active, waiting, resetting, etc. Objects of 
this family may often be altered by the manager (by means of a set operation) in order to modify 
the behaviour of the managed system (i.e. to perform a shutdown, or a reset operation).
• Accounting Information usually represented by a set of counters that keep track of the number of 
times a given event has occurred. Examples of these objects are the number of packets received by 
an ethernet interface or the number of messages that have been sent to a given e-mail server.
The combination of the above families of objects is often sufficient for providing a synthetic view of the 
managed object and for exercising a limited control over it. The diagnose and eventual fixing of most faults 
necessitates both more detailed information and more powerful means of control. This fact has resulted in 
the emergence of more detailed MIBs for specific distributed applications which provide a better picture of 
the managed application. The X.500 Directory Monitoring MIB [76] and the Mail Monitoring MIB [69]
dealing respectively with the distributed naming architecture and electronic mail systems are good examples 
of this trend.
2.1.1 MIBs are not enough
These MIBs, which are specifically designed to provide a good level of detail about given distrib-
uted application, constitute an adequate basis to build monitoring consoles. However when it takes to diag-
nose and automatically correct system faults, other sources of information should be taken into account:
• Standard output from the application. Many distributed applications produce logging data (log-
files) that is mainly used for accounting purposes. This information represents a valuable input to 
the manager since it provides historical data allowing to observe the evolution of the system. A 
good example on how historical information can be used to detect faults within an Electronic-mail 
system can be found in [94].
• Non-complicit information. Programming errors and conception flaws may result in incorrect out-
put data produced by the application. This problem also affects information on MIBs since manage-
ment agents are usually tightly dependent on the core application. In this case, an external, non com-
plicit view of the application behaviour will provide reliable information to the manager process. A 
non-complicit “observer” which reconstructs e-mail transactions relying exclusively on packets col-
lected directly from the network, has been developed within our E-mail management project [3]. 
Other monitoring tools (i.e. shell commands as netstat to find out the state of a connection), ex-
ternal to the application may provide trustful information that should be taken into account.- 20 -
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tion are caused either by physical resources shortage (disk full, not enough memory, etc.) or by mal-
functions in underlying distributed applications (such as naming or authentication services). Man-
agement information regarding the operational status of underlying resources is, thus, essential to 
correctly identify particular error scenarios.
• Input from exterior parts of the managed system. When dealing with largely distributed and het-
erogeneous applications (such as the E-mail system) it is illusory to assume that all the different 
parts of the system will share the same management information model. Even if a MIB is supposed 
to be generic, it is very likely that different vendors will propose different MIBs (some of them may 
not even provide MIBs at all). Furthermore, information from parts of the system beyond our do-
main of responsibility are also relevant for the achievement of an accurate diagnostic.
2.1.2 Classifying Management Information
The fact of integrating large amounts of information coming from distinct sources results in the need of cor-
rectly classifying and processing this data so that it can be used by the management system. This process 
brings forward several issues about the nature of information and the way it should be processed.
• Heterogeneous vs. homogeneous information: As stated above, a sound distributed management 
architecture should integrate information originated at various sources, internal and external to the 
system under management. According to the source, this data will appear in different formats (log-
file-line, command output, etc.) or result from incompatible management interfaces. In order to be 
properly processed this data may need to be presented to the management system in an homogene-
ous form.
• Specific vs. generic information: By design, objects contained in a MIB should be generic. In other 
words, two pieces of software implementing similar functionality are supposed to provide identical 
MIB interfaces. Unfortunately the situation in the real world is quite different and the E-mail exam-
ple is very eloquent in this context: despite a definition for a standard e-mail MIB exists [69], the 
existence of specific variables and their semantics depend on the underlying protocol (SMTP, 
X.400, etc.) and even on the software vendor. An appropriate management architecture built upon 
widely distributed applications involving a number of different protocols and software platforms 
should provide a solution to this issue.
• Precise vs. concise information: The large volume of fine granularity management information re-
sulting from a management system brings forward the need for appropriate correlation and filtering 
mechanisms. Precise diagnostic of a complex fault will certainly involve detailed management in-
formation concerning several parts of the system. However, the fact of having a small set of concise 
management variables covering the actual status of involved sub-systems (e.g. Naming Services 
= OK, System Resources = OK, etc.) will facilitate the deployment of a low-cost and permanent 
monitoring policy. These variables will be re-computed on a time basis that depend on the nature of 
the application.
This classification of the management information provides different views of the system under manage-
ment. These views are essential to design adapted management policies at each level and to better distribute 
the management functionality.- 21 -
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2.2.1 The Need for Intermediate Entities
The centralized management paradigm inherent to early management protocols has been rightly questioned 
both by the academic [48] [50] and commercial [70] communities. This paradigm confers all the “intelli-
gence” to the management station while the agent is basically limited to collect information and make it 
available to the management station in a well-defined form. This approach presents two fundamental draw-
backs when applied to a distributed application automated management system:
• Scaling problems. The amount and diversity of management information, as described in section 
§2.1, together with the difficulties inherent to the programming of accurate diagnosis algorithms, 
add significant complexity to the design of a centralized management station. As the size of the 
managed system grows, this issue becomes even more critical.
• Impact in the management response-time. In classical network management approaches, the ele-
ment which is close to the management system (i.e. the agent) does not have the capability to ana-
lyse potential faults and perform correcting actions. Any faulty behaviour is transmitted to the man-
agement console and analysed by the human manager sitting behind. This introduces a significant 
delay in the reaction time of the management system and may negatively affect the behaviour of 
time-critical applications. As a consequence, a fundamental requirement for an automated manage-
ment system is to shift the management intelligence as close as possible to the system under man-
agement.
One of the first practical examples of decentralizing the management functionality was the introduction of 
a MIB definition describing the behavior of a remote network monitoring device (RMON, [133]). The role 
of this intermediate manager consists in permanently collecting management information from a local net-
work and identifying potential failures; when a severe error condition is detected, an alarm is submitted to 
the central management station. This solution is especially convenient: a) for large networks since it allows 
to bring down the computing demands of the central management station and b) for widely spread inter-net-
works where management information is collected locally and, as a consequence, communication costs are 
substantially reduced. The benefits in terms of scaling of this approach are also obvious.
The distribution of the processing demands and the reduction of communications stressed by the 
RMON approach in the management of physical networks constitute also essential requirements in the 
world of distributed applications. In the first case, the most suitable solution consists in physically locating 
intermediate managers close to the set of devices under management. When dealing with distributed appli-
cations, the choice of a management architecture and an appropriate assignment of management tasks, both 
reducing computing overhead and facilitating scaling, is a quite complex task. Furthermore, when the main 
objective of the management system is to diagnose and repair error conditions (not only passive monitoring 
as RMON) both issues become even more relevant. These design issues will actually dictate how the “intel-
ligence” is distributed amongst management entities and, as a consequence, how the system will react to 
potential faults.
2.2.2 Classifying Management Functionality
Considering the different layers of management information mentioned in section §2.1.2 and the 
characteristics of distributed applications, a first functional separation of management tasks can be intro-
duced. For each category, examples of management functions related to the E-mail management framework 
are provided:- 22 -
2  Towards a Model for Managing Distributed Applications• Platform-level management: As stated before, in the absence of a generic management interface 
(e.g. an agent plus a MIB) or when an existing interface lacks of full management functionality, a 
robust MDA architecture should cope with application’s specifics. The set of management policies 
and tasks specific to an application should be aware of the application internals and have a very nar-
row scope with respect to the whole managed system. Typical management operations accom-
plished at this level are: modify number of channels running at a time, restart X.400 to SMTP header 
conversion, etc. 
• Application-level management: This level encloses management policies covering the generic be-
haviour of a distributed application. Freeze a blocking message, flush a message queue or test the 
connection with a remote E-mail server are usual management operations accomplished at this lev-
el.
• Component-level management: Take into consideration an application component under manage-
ment including the underlying software (such as DNS) and hardware resources (CPU charge, mem-
ory or disk space available, etc.). Management decisions at this level are more complex since they 
involve several sub-systems and, as a consequence, have larger impact in the overall application be-
havior. Typical management operations achieved at this level are: if disk is full interrupt the mes-
sage accepting service, if peer system is down, modify routing tables, etc.
The management decisions taken at the component level result in finer granularity sub-actions at the appli-
cation level and so on. As an example, the management decision “stop a mail-relay” will be decomposed in 
several application-level actions, such as: stop the server daemon, stop the routing decision process, stop the 
message sending channels, etc. These actions will be decomposed, in turn, in other platform-level ones deal-
ing with the particularity of the application. For instance, the action “stop the server demon” will be decom-
posed at this level in “stop the SMTP server” and “stop the X.400 server”. The figure 2-1 shows how these 
functionality groups interact with the information model described in section 2.1.2.
2.2.3 Delegation and Subsidiarity
Relying on the classification of the management functionality described in section §2.2.2, we discuss here 
how different management entities coordinate and distribute their work. The concepts of delegation and sub-
sidiarity rule the behavior of a set of entities that are hierarchically arranged. A higher-level unit A is re-
sponsible for carrying out a task. A divides this task into sub-tasks, delegates responsibility for those sub-
tasks to its subordinate units B, C, and D and coordinates their work (c.f. Fig. 2-2). A has a generic view of 
the whole task, but it lacks specific knowledge of how to execute the sub-tasks. On the other hand, the sub-
ordinate units B, C, and D are specialized for carrying out their sub-task but their view of the task is limited. 
Although a subordinate unit does its best to carry out its sub-task correctly, situations can occur where it will 
fail. In this case, the subordinate unit has to inform its superior of the failure. It is then the role of the superior - 23 -
Part II   Domain Collaborations in Distributed Applications Managementto try and solve the problem from its higher-level view. Note that the concept of delegation and subsidiarity 
are recursive, and not limited to two levels as in this explanation. 
Subsidiarity is commonly used in human organizations, such as enterprises. The power of subsidiarity is to 
allow inferior management units to forward problems that they are unable to fix to upper units that have bet-
ter chance to solve by their broader view of the system. The power of the delegation is the ability to have a 
task carried out by units that are closer to the managed application. Thus, subsidiarity is a bottom-up concept 
whereas delegation is top-down. Both subsidiarity and delegation contribute significantly to the scalability 
of distributed systems. In our opinion, these concepts are the keystone for efficient management of distrib-
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2  Towards a Model for Managing Distributed Applicationsuted applications. Section §3 will describe how these concepts have been implemented in our management 
system.
2.3 The Structure of the Management Application
From a structural point of view, a management solution for distributed applications should be considered as 
a conjunction of two fundamental elements:
• The management solution for separate components of the system - such as specific mail relays for 
the E-mail service or a set of DNS servers for the global directory service. This point focus on the 
way a manager node must be organized in order to properly achieve the management of a (set of) 
separate components. The management framework comprising both the information and functional 
model described in sections §2.1 and §2.2 must be placed in this context. 
• The architecture needed to manage the distributed application as a whole. How the different man-
ager nodes should be designed, organized (topologically), grouped and linked in order to better suit 
the management needs of the considered application.
Figure 2-3 illustrates the distinction between the structure of the management application (located 
in the management plane) and the application to be managed (the application plane). The discontinuous 
links between both planes represent the management relations between specific components of the applica-
tion and the manager nodes. Note that the management functionality provided by these nodes may in turn 
be distributed amongst sub-manager entities according to the criteria presented in sections §2.2.
Figure 2-3 (a) shows a simple management solution where all the application components are man-
aged separately by several manager nodes. This approach has been inherited from the centralized paradigm 
characteristic of initial network management protocols. Still today, most of existing management solutions 
for distributed applications (such as [69] for Electronic Mail and [76] for the X.500 Directory Service) also 
concentrate on separate parts of the application without considering the system as a whole. Amongst exist-
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Part II   Domain Collaborations in Distributed Applications Managementing management approaches, only TMN (see section §1.3) provides an appropriate support for more elabo-
rated management architectures mostly oriented to the telecommunications network environment.
Figures 2-3(b) and 2-3(c) show two different management topologies that can be used as a support 
for a global management infrastructure. More generally, the design of a collaborative management architec-
ture will be based on several criteria:
• The range of authority of a manager node. In order to design an adequate management architec-
ture, we should decide which components of the application plane are under the responsibility of a 
single manager node in the management plane. A possible classification would consist in assigning 
a manager to each active element (such as a mail relay or a name server); other applications may 
require to assign a manager node to the transactions taking place between active elements instead 
of directly managing the components. A combination of both alternatives is also possible.
• The dependencies between manager nodes. The structure of the application will determine the na-
ture of the relationship between manager nodes. For instance, applications having flat, peer to peer 
dependencies as SMTP based E-mail applications need a management structure that follows this 
model with managers collaborating in a peer-to-peer basis (see figure 2-3(b)). On the contrary, an 
application having a hierarchical structure as a global naming service (i.e. DNS) requires hierarchi-
cal dependencies between manager nodes (see figure 2-3(c)).
• The structuring in domains. Those management frameworks coping with large sets of application 
components will need to group them in domains of responsibility to better design and apply man-
agement policies affecting the application plane. On the other hand, introducing domains in the 
management plane will contribute to structure the management application and promote inter-do-
main collaborations in order to better address faults involving several domains. The existence of a 
well-defined domain collaboration infrastructure also allows for establishing restricted exchanges 
of management information across administrative borders.
• The communication mechanisms. As explained in section §2.4.1 mechanisms allowing for tight 
collaboration between manager entities should be devised. These mechanisms will be more restric-
tive when involved managers belong to different administrative authorities.
2.4 Management Interactions
This section deals with the way involved management entities exchange information. Firstly, we focus on 
the underlying low-level mechanisms allowing entities to communicate; the shortcomings of current solu-
tions are analyzed and suggested approaches to this issue are discussed. The second sub-section deals with 
the mode of communication by pointing out the limitations of classical polling-oriented solution when com-
pared to event-driven ones.
2.4.1 The Underlying Mechanisms
After the definition of the information and functional components, we should deal with the way these dif-
ferent components interact. Firstly, a clear distinction should be made about the different kind of interactions 
that may take place in a management system. Depending on the components involved, we distinguish three 
different types of interactions:
1) Manager - management information. 
2) Manager - managed system- 26 -
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This quite intuitive classification is blurred in classical management architectures that rely in very 
simple protocols (i.e. get and set protocols like SNMP or CMIP). The first and second interactions occur in 
the context of manager-agent relationship. Basically, the first one is based on the get operation for retriev-
ing management information; the second one relies on the set operation, by which the manager acts on the 
managed system as side effect of a variable modification; the manager-to-manager interaction is not clearly 
defined in classical protocols although complementary work as [17] rely on the get and set paradigm for 
information exchanges between managers.
This model has been successfully applied in the management of equipments where the kind of ac-
tions achieved on the managed systems are very simple (i.e. rebooting network devices, modifying config-
uration parameters, etc.). This approach presents significant advantages in terms of agent simplicity which 
constitutes an essential requirement for devices lacking computer power.
For those environments, like the management of distributed applications, where computing resourc-
es are not a critical issue, this model should be reviewed. In particular, a clear distinction should be made 
between: a) the acquisition of management information (first point) as the basis for “low cost” monitoring 
of the managed application and b) the exchanges required to diagnose and fix potential failures (second 
point). The first case requires only a reliable and efficient communication channel and the possibility to ex-
change management information; the get and set protocols together with an adequate information model 
constitute a valid approach for this means. On the contrary, the actual requirements of diagnosis and active 
management go far beyond the capabilities of a get and set interface between the manager and the managed 
system. Ideally, the manager should be provided with a powerful console where he can execute a rich set of 
commands and perform exhaustive testing of the application behavior. The fundamental reasons of why this 
is impractical under the get and set paradigm are the following:
• No support for composite actions. Certain corrective actions are the result of a suite of simple 
management sub-tasks to be executed in a well-defined manner. According to the get and set para-
digm, management actions are executed by the agent asynchronously from the management proto-
col; the only means for the agent to provide information about executed actions are MIB variables. 
Obviously this mechanism is by large inadequate for synchronizing the execution of several man-
agement sub-tasks.
• Limitations for exchanging results. The rigidity of the action execution environment (need for 
“artificial” variables) result in serious limitations for both representing and sharing the results of a 
management task.
• No clear failure semantics. The get and set mechanism does not offer an adequate support to spec-
ify the agent behavior in case of failure in the management protocol (i.e. execute at most or at least
once, etc.). This point is particularly relevant when critical management actions need to be accom-
plished.
A candidate for providing an adequate support for the manager - managed system interaction is the 
Remote Procedure Call (RPC, [10]) model. RPC relies on a classical client/server pattern of communica-
tions, where the client may invoke the execution of a set of predefined procedures by the server. Applied to 
the management case, the managed system (acting as the server) would export a collection of management 
procedures to be invoked by the manager (acting as the client). This model is considerably more powerful 
than the get and set paradigm and would constitute a valid support for a flexible management interface. 
However, the need to statically define the set of management procedures constitutes a significant drawback 
that reduces the operational range of the manager. This has lead us to favor a more flexible option based on 
remote script execution that will be described in section §3.- 27 -
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laboration between managers. As an example, If managers involved in the communications work under sep-
arate and loosely dependent management authorities, they will demand a simple (and secure) mechanism 
allowing to share concise management information. A get and set solution provided with ad-hoc restrictions 
in terms of authentication and confidentiality may suffice for this kind of transactions. On the contrary, those 
interactions taking place between managers that collaborate to fix an error occurring under the same admin-
istrative authority will require more flexible interaction mechanisms such as RPC or remote scripting.
2.4.2 Event-Driven versus Polling-Oriented
The normal mode of communication of most common network management protocols relies in the polling 
paradigm. The central management station periodically polls the agents in order to acquire management in-
formation for further processing. The agents are not allowed to initiate a management transaction unless an 
exceptional event occurs. The use of traps is even strongly discouraged(1) by standards describing the 
SNMP protocol. The use of polling as the fundamental mode of communication for a management architec-
ture results in significant drawbacks:
• Excessive management traffic. In order to detect failures as soon as possible, the management sta-
tion must poll all the agents at a high pace which generates a large and continuous amount of traffic 
even under normal circumstances. In very large networks, this may have a negative impact on the 
overall network throughput.
• Low response time to incorrect behaviours. All the faults that are not in the scope of trap generation 
(most of them) will be detected only when the central management stations polls the involved agent. 
Furthermore, if the central management station does not have appropriate filtering policies, the 
problem may go undetected under the load of management information.
The positive side in the polling paradigm resides in the simplicity of management agents and, once again, 
this constitutes a solid argument for integrating agents in low power computing devices. However when 
considering the application management, as the management intelligence is shifted closer to the application 
by introducing intermediate entities, this argument does not hold any more. In this environment where en-
tities have higher management responsibility, an event-driven mode of communication is preferable. In a 
typical fault scenario, a management entity would try its best to solve a given problem and would only notify 
a superior node when it is unable to solve it. This preemptive notification becomes thus the rule of manage-
ment exchanges rather than the exception.
3 The Distributed Management Tree (DMT)
The Distributed Management Tree (DMT) [3] is a hierarchical structure designed for the management of 
distributed applications. It is composed of nodes which are active units containing (a) variables for storing 
management information and (b) “programs” which govern the node's behavior. The leaves are a special 
type of nodes and occupy a particular position: they constitute the boundary between the DMT itself and the 
system under management (SuM). Here, the interactions between the DMT and the SuM take place: infor-
mation on the state of the SuM is extracted and commands are issued to it. 
The nodes communicate with their parents and children in the tree hierarchy, transmitting two kinds 
of data: state information and action commands. Information on the state of the SuM (state information) 
1 quote from RFC1212- 28 -
3  The Distributed Management Tree (DMT)flows upwards through the DMT and commands to influence the behavior of the system (action commands) 
are propagated downwards. 
 The DMT structure can also be illustrated from a network management point of view. The DMT 
nodes are dual-role entities: they act as agent and manager at the same time. (Fig. 1) The sets of variables 
represent management information bases (MIBs) and the programs in the nodes can be thought of as small 
management applications, which, in cooperation, form a distributed management system. The leaves repre-
sent network management agents, and the communication between the nodes is based on classical GET and 
SET primitives of a network management protocol.
3.1 Using the DMT Framework for Management Tasks
The task of management requires two complementary activities: monitoring and active control. The former 
consists in critical observation of the system with the aim to detect faulty behavior, the latter consists in ex-
ecuting suitable corrective interventions on the system in case of an error. In the following chapters, it will 
be described how the DMT structure is used to achieve these two tasks. Note that the DMT needs to be pro-
grammed: the nodes execute small programs which determine their behavior in communicating with other 
nodes and in processing pieces of management information. 
3.1.1 Monitoring: Information Flow
Information is extracted from the SuM in the leaves of the tree. Any node of the DMT (except for the leaves) 
retrieves the information stored in the variables of their children nodes with the aim to refine it and produce 
information with a higher semantic content, which in turn is available to their parents. This is the “informa-
tion flow” shown in Figure 1. As a result, a low-level node contains detailed information on a small part of 
the SuM and a high-level node concise information about a large part of the system.
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now be discussed in some more details.
Due to abstraction, the DMT contains state information about the managed system with different 
levels of detail: in the lowest levels this information is very detailed and specific to the particular underlying 
part of the SuM, in high levels the information is more concise and abstract. The abstraction process is to a 
large degree based on reference values. The information retrieved from each child node is compared with 
suitable reference values - this represents a process of interpretation and classification of underlying state 
information. As a result, new state information with a higher semantic content is obtained. 
This concept can be illustrated by an example. In a leaf of the DMT there is a variable containing 
numerical information on the disk space which is available to a specific managed application. This value as 
such does not have much meaning since the amount of required disk space varies from application to appli-
cation. Therefore, this variable is compared to a reference value which specifies the needs in disk space of 
the particular underlying application. The result of the interpretation could, in the simplest case, be one of 
the following values: OK or PROBLEM,- the first meaning “the available disk space is ok” and the latter “there 
is not enough disk space available”. In a more elaborate system the state of the component might be de-
scribed with several values (e.g. OK, WARNING, PROBLEM), or with a sort of ranking from 1 to X, like a 
percentage figure.
The second mechanism, correlation, consists in the act of combining information from different 
parts of the system which are functionally or logically related to each other. As a result, a broader and more 
general view of the underlying components of the system is obtained, which allows to assess whether the 
different parts of the system collaborate correctly and provide the functions they are supposed to provide.  
The tree structure of the DMT is well-suited for the support of correlation since each node collects informa-
tion from its children. The entirety of the descendants of a node, (i.e. the node’s sub-tree) corresponds in 
fact to the part of the system a node overlooks, the node’s scope: a node at a higher level in the DMT gen-
erally has a larger scope than a lower-level node.
3.1.2 Active Management: Command Flow
The DMT does not only refine information on the state of the managed system, but also controls the system 
by supporting the notion of actions together with mechanisms of sending action commands downwards 
through the DMT to the SuM.
This has the effect of a command flow with opposite direction to the information flow described 
above. Each node receives orders from their parent and splits them up into more elementary commands 
propagated to their children. Although this sounds quite simple, it requires intelligent processing in the 
nodes to determine the nature and sequence of commands to issue. The programs executed by a node imple-
ment suitable algorithms and the node’s variables contain information about the underlying system which 
allows to determine the type of commands to be sent downwards. By analogy to the information refinement 
process, the scope and the specificity of the actions therefore depend on the node's level in the DMT hierar-
chy. Actions in a low level node (e.g. in the leaves) are very specialized commands which have effect only 
on a small part of the system; higher in the DMT hierarchy, these commands are more generic and the part 
of the system which is controlled is larger.
It has been said in the introduction that the distributed systems which shall be managed are hetero-
geneous and that the components providing logically similar service (e.g. Mail relays) are very diverse in 
their implementations and have different management interfaces. At a higher hierarchic level, the DMT pre-
sents a homogeneous view of such components: the variables are the same for the different implementations 
underneath, the status information and the action handles have homogeneous semantics. When an action is - 30 -
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able for the specific implementation. Note that this has some relation with the concept of abstraction that 
has been shown for the information flow: it actually is the contrary of abstraction.
As a counterpart of correlation described for the information flow, there is the concept of action ex-
plosion. It takes place when a command received from above is split up into multiple sub-commands to be 
sent to different underlying nodes. This shall be illustrated with an example: at some medium level in the 
DMT hierarchy the decision is taken to restart an E-mail relay. An action called “restart E-mail relay” is 
triggered and commands propagate through the branches of the sub-tree which covers the single components 
of the E-mail relay. They are split up in a number of more specific commands, such as “restart queue control 
process”, and “restart underlying communication resources”. The nodes underneath will know how to per-
form this task, e.g. how to identify the queue control process and which command-line to use for restarting it.
4 Collaborative Management Domains
As mentioned in the introduction, the most common approach to associate the notion of domain to manage-
ment practices consists grouping elements or system components into well defined domains to better design 
and apply management policies and to demarcate responsibility amongst multiple domains. In this section 
we propose a framework that goes one step further by introducing domain collaborations. 
4.1 Topology Issues
In section §2.2 we have outlined the need to distribute the management functionality and in section §3 we 
have introduced the Distributed Management Tree as a hierarchical infrastructure where manager and man-
aged entities can interact. The figure 2-4 shows a simplified example where the managed entity is represent-
ed by a set of components at the same level that interact directly with the DMT through the leaves of the 
inverted tree. In most cases, distributed applications are constituted by complex topologies (trees, graphs, 
etc.) and a number of interconnections between the different components. These links may need to be 
mapped into the management system in order to effectively monitor and control the application behaviour. 
As a result, one should differentiate between two different kind of links or management paths:
• The links that constitute the information flow of the managed application that should be reflected 
in the management system (horizontal links).
• The abstraction flow that propagates information exclusively within the management system as 
shown in figure 2-4 (vertical links).
When talking about collaborative domains it is essential to clarify, how these domains are composed, for 
instance, how many manager entities constitute a management domain and how they are interconnected. In 
order to appropriately address this issue, we need to know the nature and topology of the application under 
management. As an example, two management arbitrating on the excessive e-mail traffic flowing between 
two mail relays will need to collaborate at the level where this traffic can be evaluated and analyzed. On the 
contrary, if the problem resides in the lack of connectivity between two Message Transfer Agents, the man-
ager entities dealing with system and network configuration will carry out the collaboration to resolve the 
issue.
In order to appropriately establish the ground for this collaboration, the security aspects should be 
analyzed. In particular, the authentication schemes supporting domain granularity and the access rules ac-
cording to well-defined policies. These issues will be further discussed in section and in Fig. 4.3 and in Part 
III of this work.- 31 -
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Together with the topology design, the most important component of the collaboration model is the defini-
tion of the management interactions. From a functional perspective, two main collaboration groups are dis-
tinguished: passive collaborations where only information is exchanged and active collaborations where ac-
tions are effectively carried out on neighbor domains. The security implications of this collaboration frame-
work is also discussed.
4.2.1 Passive Collaboration
Management information is exchanged between domains for which there is a collaboration contract. Infor-
mation may be published and browsed by authorized entities in other domains or provided on-demand. Pub-
lished information may include statements about the application state in a given moment, such as: "all the 
servers are responding correctly", "the present load of the system is above average", etc. As an example of 
queries, an authorized management entity from domain A may ask for operational information to the domain 
B manager, such as “is traffic normal?”, “are your mail servers responding correctly?”, etc. The most rele-
vant characteristics of passive collaborations are the following:
• The various levels of abstraction of the Distributed Management Tree constitute an appropriate 
structural basis for information exchanges. The different levels will provide the appropriate view to 
disclose the best suited information to peer domains. However, the notion of views (parts of the in-
formation tree that are made accessible) should be applied to each collaboration contract in order to 
prevent non authorized disclosures.
• Low security risks. Although operational information can be used to obtain unauthorized knowl-
edge of the system, the security risks of disclosing information is reduced compared to the active 
collaboration framework.
• Semantics. Management information may be subject to different interpretations if it is not under-
stood in the same way by all the participants. This problem is common to all the management pro-
tocols in general and is addressed by the introduction of normalized Management Information Bas-
es. 
4.2.2 Active Collaborations
Under an active collaboration contract, parties are authorized to trigger actions in a set of specific domains. 
Examples of active collaboration tasks include: carry out a diagnostic on a particular application component, 
trigger a patch installation to prevent a security hole, etc. Active collaboration can be implemented in dif-
ferent ways: 
• Pre-defined test routines: “Push buttons” for performing generic/specific tests. examples: “Test all 
the mail servers”. “Search for e-mail loops”, etc. These routines can be imagined as management 
sand boxes where the action range is limited and, as a result, the security risks are also reduced.
• RPC-like mechanism, where remote procedures are executed on parameters provided by neighbour 
domains. Although, the executed procedure is fixed by the local domain and cannot be modified, 
this approach confers a greater control to contracting domains but exposes the target to increased 
security risks.
• Joint, independent execution: Each manager performs actions in his domain attempting to solve the 
problem and then operate in a coordinated way in order to establish a diagnostic and trigger a cor-
rective action (This is the closest to the human paradigm). - 32 -
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domain platform (java applet, active-x, PerlREX (See section §4.4.2) etc.). This option encompass-
es extremely high security which are only limited by the executing platform. 
It should be noted that the “degree of trust” between domains plays an essential role when selecting an active 
collaboration option. The first two alternatives are better suited for those cases where trust is limited be-
tween intervening domains whereas the two others are more convenient for domains mutually trusted (e.g. 
depending on the same management entity, sitting in an Intranet, etc.)
4.3 Security Framework and Collaboration Contracts
The described collaboration infrastructure needs an appropriate security framework in order to ensure that 
only legitimate transactions are authorized and to prevent sensitive information disclosure.
At the top level of the security framework, we need to define collaboration contracts based on the 
various degrees of trust inherent to the participating entities. Contracts established between highly trusted 
domains will reflect tight relationships including passive and active collaboration authorizations. Only those 
entities participating in the collaboration framework will have active collaboration contracts and, as a result, 
will be authorized to establish management transactions. 
Privilege management is ensured by domain authoritative entities that keep Access Control Lists 
indicating the corresponding access rights for each collaborating domain. Different authorization levels will 
be determined by the above mentioned collaboration contracts.
Concerning transaction security, domain-based cryptographic keys (see Part III for details) are as-
sociated to each domain identity. These keys constitute the necessary ground to deploy security protocols 
providing the necessary security services (confidentiality, authentication, integrity, etc.). The protocol used 
in each cased depends on the nature of the transaction (information exchange or retrieval, remote execution, 
etc.). Strong authentication controls may be set up to authorize highly sensitive transactions.
4.4 Building blocks
This section describes the most relevant programming tools that have been developed in the framework of 
our research project to validate the concepts described so far. 
4.4.1 SNMPerl
An extension of the Perl programming language with SNMP libraries ([3]). SNMPerl is well-suited for the 
development of the DMT nodes since it allows to easily build dual-role SNMP entities (i.e., entities having 
both the manager and the agent side of SNMP). Both the nodes and the management scripts are currently 
implemented in SNMPerl.
4.4.2 PerlRex
Overview
The PERL Remote Execution (PerlREX) package is an extension of PERL, built as a library module of hi-
level functions providing support for:- 33 -
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tion, PerlRex incorporates a whole set of procedures allowing to establish reliable TCP connections 
(including error handling) between the manager and the agent. The support for both encoding and 
exchange of PERL code chunks has been implemented, by means of PERL function calls, on top of 
this TCP connection.
• Restricted PERL execution platform. In order to reduce security risks, PerlREX constitutes a re-
stricted platform where downloaded PERL scripts are executed. This platform provides all the basic 
programming structures of the PERL language but imposes severe limitations in selected areas in 
order to preserve the integrity of the code server; in particular:
• No access to the command processor (shell). 
• Limited access to PERL built-in functions. PERL has a vast number of built-in functions pro-
viding direct access to sensitive parts of the system (file system, network, etc.). The use of 
these functions is forbidden for downloaded chunks of code.
• Access to data objects restricted to a well-defined package. In order to prevent improper ac-
cess to server’s private objects, the allowed name space of downloaded code is limited to a 
well-defined package. Data objects that need to be shared by the server should be explicitly 
declared inside this package.
• Suppression of support for evaluated code. PERL offers powerful mechanisms (eval) that al-
low the creation of PERL code at run-time. Since these mechanisms offer unlimited possibil-
ities to create “on the fly” commands that are extremely difficult to parse and control, we have 
chosen to forbid the utilization of this feature.
• Support for the exchange of structured results. A powerful framework has been designed and 
implemented allowing to transparently exchange all the data structures (scalar or structured) exist-
ing in PERL. Results may also be returned in the form of html pages if a specific option is provided 
at the client side. This facility is especially convenient when management tasks are remotely driven 
from a web browser.
Assessment of Importance
The existence of a remote script execution facility has significantly facilitated the development of 
elaborated tasks and in particular to implement scenarios of active collaboration such as those described in 
section §4.2.2. Benefiting from such a powerful mechanism for close collaboration between the manager 
and managed system, we have notably improved the performance and generality of management functions 
and drastically reduced the overall implementation time.
5 Practical Management Scenarios
This section describes practical management scenarios that have been implemented relying on the proposed 
structure.- 34 -
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One of the major threats to the E-mail service are message loops, mail messages which endlessly circulate 
between a number of E-mail relays and severely deteriorate or even interrupt the messaging service. Al-
though the standards ruling E-mail communications include mechanisms to prevent message loops, these 
mechanisms are often not implemented and, if they are, can fail to work reliably under certain circumstanc-
es. The method illustrated here proposes a novel approach to the automatic and reliable elimination of loop-
ing messages. A more detailed description of this work can be found in [121].
In summary the detection of messages that might be looping is carried out by analyzing statistical 
properties of the message traffic. Suspect messages are earmarked, and if they are observed to actually be 
looping, they are eliminated. This method has been implemented and successfully applied in the multi-pro-
tocol E-mail environment of the University of Geneva.
5.1.1 Problem Description
A message is said to be looping if it is endlessly forwarded in a circular manner between a set of mail relays 
(also called Message Transfer Agents or MTAs). Normally, there are two or three mail relays that take part 
in a message loop, but there can be more than that. The period of a loop (the time it takes to complete) ranges 
from a few seconds to a few minutes. Looping messages usually grow in size, since mail relays typically 
add header lines to the messages they process. 
A mail that loops during a weekend can be forwarded ten thousands of times, grow in size up to 
megabytes and produce megabytes of logging data. The situation is even much worse if distribution lists are 
involved in the loop (c.f. [129]): the number of mails explodes and after a short time the mail system crashes 
under the load. These scenarios illustrate how important it is to automatically detect and eliminate looping 
messages.
Loops are caused by wrong addressing configuration on one or more systems: 
• ²bad configuration of mail relays e.g. a relay that does not “recognize” messages addressed to it and, 
instead of keeping them for local delivery, forwards them to a central mail relay which sends them 
back again(1).
• ²automatic forward mechanisms such as aliases, distribution lists, or personal forward mechanisms 
(.forward files) pointing to invalid addresses. 
• ²automatic reply mechanisms, such as vacation programs or non-delivery reports.
The mechanisms that are directly under control of a proficient administrator account for only a small part of 
the errors. The problem lies much more in the forwarding facilities that are under user control, such as ~/
.forward files and vacation programs or even mail relays installed without the administrator knowing. 
Furthermore, even if all the mail relays in a given responsibility domain are perfectly configured, a mail 
transaction with a misconfigured or non-compliant site may result in a message loop.
5.1.2 Standard Mechanisms for Loop Detection
There are two typical countermeasures that are integrated into the mail relays or taken by postmasters:
1 This is the behavior of many pre-installed sendmails.- 35 -
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relay processing a message must add such a line to the message header and count the number of 
Received from lines already contained. When the header encloses more than a pre-defined 
number (e.g. 25) of such lines, the message is considered to be looping and automatically sent back 
to the expeditor together with a non-delivery report. Fixing such a limit is quite a delicate task (es-
pecially due to the growing complexity of the Internet).
• Tracing Message IDs. Message IDs allow to uniquely identify E-mail messages. Postmasters can 
inspect the log-files and check if the same Message ID recurs multiple times. If this is the case, the 
corresponding message is considered to be looping. 
Both of these approaches work well if there are only mail relays of one protocol involved. However, they 
can fail in a multi-protocol environment (e.g. SMTP [95][27] together with X.400 [61](1)) or in case of faulty 
configurations or non-compliance to the protocol recommendations. When a message is translated into a dif-
ferent E-mail protocol by a gateway, Received from lines can get lost; some gateways can even be explic-
itly configured to eliminate them. The same problem exists for Message IDs: some mail relays change the 
old Message ID and assign a new one. Furthermore, both methods fail if a new message is generated in the 
looping process (e.g. vacation or non-delivery reports). 
5.1.3 Related Work
Most existing solutions rely on the mechanisms described above and are normally included in mail relay 
implementations. A recent work being conducted by D. Bernstein [6] proposes a set of recommendations 
for so-called automailers (a generic term designating mail relays, list exploders, vacation programs, etc.). 
Due to the great number and diversity of existent software implementations, compliance to these recommen-
dations will not be achieved in a foreseeable future (if ever...) and the need of external mechanisms, as the 
one proposed in this paper, will persist.
To our knowledge, there is no independent, commonly agreed-on solution for preventing loops be-
tween E-mail systems. The approach adopted by some administrators consists in periodically observing the 
message traffic for a given period of time in order to find potential loops. Unfortunately, the most common 
practice consists in reacting “a posteriori”, alerted by the unpleasant effects of a loop in the E-mail system.
A more scientific approach to solve the problem of looping messages has been studied by J.F. Pac-
cini in his Ph.D. thesis [94]. He proposes a method to identify a loop by tracing suspect messages amongst 
the set of involved mail relays, the tracing information being shared by each mail relay by means of a stan-
dardized distributed database (X.500, [57]). The two major drawbacks of this approach are the significant 
management overhead introduced by a distributed database and the security issues related to the sharing of 
sensitive information (message trace statistics) across administrative domain borders.
5.1.4 Our Approach
The proposed method is based on a statistical analysis of the messages recently exchanged by a single mail 
relay. As will be explained, message loops have very particular statistical properties that are visible at a sin-
gle observation point. We propose to exploit these properties in order to detect suspect messages without 
having to consider management information from other mail relays.
1 Although the standard for protocol conversion (RFC-1327 - [68]) describes how trace fields should be con-
verted, a number of mail relay products are not compliant to these recommendations.- 36 -
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upon specific conditions directly related to loop problems: abnormal message rate and/or abnormal disk or 
CPU usage. E-mail related information can be obtained by periodically querying the mail relay console or 
by means of an SNMP agent that provides monitoring data in the form of a MIB (c.f. [69]). Information con-
cerning system resources can be retrieved by means of standard UNIX commands.
The process of loop detection and suppression is composed of two phases: the first focuses on the 
detection of suspect messages based on the logging information of recent message exchanges and the second 
aims at the accurate identification and elimination of messages that do actually loop.
Detection of Suspect Messages
The aim of this process is to identify those messages that might be looping. To achieve this, we build a sta-
tistical database based on the historical information (log-files) generated by the mail relay where the obser-
vation point is located. Note that the necessary data is contained in the log-files of about any existing E-mail 
implementation:
• The Sender and Receiver addresses. Since Message ID information is not always reliable, the only 
invariant of a looping message observed from one specific point are the sender and receiver address-
es of the envelope. Figure 3 shows that this assertion does not hold when the observation point 
changes (address rewritten by involved mail relays). This information, that we denote SR pair, con-
stitutes the search key of our statistical database.
• The number of messages exchanged by this SR pair.
• Absolute time of last message exchange. This value is used to determine whether the loop is still 
active or not.
• Time lapses between occurrences of the same SR pair: A set of integer values containing the time 
intervals in seconds between messages with identical SR pairs. 
Based on this, we pick out the most often recurring SR pairs for further analysis. Generally, this will be a 
threshold-based decision where the threshold depends on site characteristics and the extent of historical in-
formation being considered. If the loop has been running for some time, the number of messages exchanged 
might be sufficient to identify a potential loop(1). However, if the loop has just begun and only a few itera-
tions have occurred, a more elaborate analysis is required to more accurately distinguish looping messages 
from normal traffic. This is done by performing statistical computations over the time lapses set, namely:
• Mean value of time lapses: The arithmetic mean value calculated over the above set of message 
lapses. This value represents the frequency of arrival of suspect messages. A low mean value im-
plies a high frequency of arrival of messages with identical SR pairs and, thus, a high probability of 
a loop.
• Variance of time lapses: The variance of time lapses measures the deviation from the mean value. 
This value is very relevant since looping messages are normally processed at uniform time intervals 
and, as a consequence, display a remarkably low variance. On the contrary, normal E-mail traffic 
has a very irregular time distribution resulting in very high variance values.
Based on this statistical information, we have elaborated a heuristic function for computing the loop prob-
ability for each SR pair appearing repeatedly in the log-files. Fig. 2-5 shows the inner workings of the heu-
ristic function that has been used to detect loops in our site. Firstly, the function tests if the number of mes-
sages exchanged is sufficiently high to ensure accurate statistical computations. The lapse between the last 
1 3000 messages are unlikely to be exchanged by two partners in a single day.- 37 -
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if the potential loop is still active. If both tests yield positive results, the effective loop probability is com-
puted. Low values for either the variance or the mean value increase loop probability. An abnormally high 
number of messages exchanged will also augment the result returned by this function. It should be noted 
that a suspect value in any of these parameters will have significant impact in the overall loop probability 
returned by the function.
 
The following example shows the results of the loop probability computations for a message loop 
(Fig. 2-6(a)) and for a regular group of messages exchanged by an SR pair (Fig. 2-6(b)). In the first case, 
note both the high frequency (approx. one message every 20 seconds) and the uniform distribution of time 
lapses between message arrival times. This results in very low mean and variance values and, as a conse-
quence, in a very high (close to 1) loop probability value. In the second example, where normal mail traffic 
is analyzed, the high variance and mean values yield a remarkably low loop probability.
Figure 2-7 shows a typical loop scenario where a message (addressed to loop@mail[123]) circu-
lates endlessly between three mail relays (for instance, due to an incorrect forward address combination for 
the loop user). The statistics are retrieved at the observation point number 1. Note that due to the high num-
ber of messages exchanged and the low mean and variance values, the loop probability (loopprob) for this 
message is very high compared to the remaining messages. As a consequence, the SR pair [a@mail3 | 
loop@mail1] is considered to be suspect and used as input for the next processing stage.
The next phase will permit to accurately determine if the selected SR pairs actually correspond to a message 
loop. If yes, the necessary corrective actions are carried out.
/*
Variables for each SR Pair:
number_of_messages, time_of_last_message, lapses_variance, lapses_mean_value;
Thresholds (depending on site characteristics):
minimum_amount_of_messages, timefactor, suspect_variance_threshold, suspect_mean_value 
*/
function loop_probability_fct {
loop_probability = 0; /* initial value */
if (number_of_messages < minimum_amount_of_messages)
/* if the number of messages is under a given threshold don’t go any further.
(statistical computations are not sufficiently accurate for a small amount of msgs.) */
return(loop_probability);
if (((current_time - time_of_last_message) / mean_value) > timefactor)
/* if the time interval between the last message and the current time is timefactor 
times higher than the mean value, we assume that the potential loop has been fixed */
return(loop_probability);
if (lapses_variance < suspect_variance_threshold)
/* if the variance is below a given threshold, increase probability */
loop_probability += 1 - lapses_variance / suspect_variance_threshold;
if (lapses_mean_value < suspect_mean_value)
/* ditto with the mean value */
loop_probability += 1 - lapses_mean_value / suspect_mean_value;
if (number_of_messages > suspect_number_of_messages)
/* if the number of messages exchanged is abnormally high, increase probability */
loop_probability += number_of_messages / total_number_of_exchanged_messages;
if (loop_probability > 1)
return (1);
else
return(loop_probability);
} /* loop_probability_fct */
Fig. 1: 
Figure 2-5: Heuristic function computing loop probability- 38 -
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If suspicious SR pairs have been identified, the program will actively wait for the corresponding messages 
to arrive and carry out the following actions for each of them:
• Freeze the suspect incoming message in order to enable write operations on the message header.
MESSAGES FROM solana@cui.unige.ch
TO = loop@bad.domain
NUMBER OF MESSAGES EXCHANGED = 75
TIMELAST = 05/04 10:29:55
LAPSES = [17, 17, 32, 18, 17, 18, 31, 
33, 18, 19, 17, 17, 17, 34, 
17, 23, 20, 22, 17, 18, 17, 
20, ...]
MEAN VALUE = 20
VARIANCE = 66
LOOP PROBABILITY = 0.97
MESSAGES FROM solana@cui.unige.ch
TO normal@cui.unige.ch
NUMBER OF MESSAGES EXCHANGED = 70
TIMELAST = 05/04 10:25:53
LAPSES = [205, 1800, 3357, 264, 45, 
188, 256, 313, 294, 141, 107, 
135, 161, 689, 1267, 691, 
5402, 24640, ...]
MEAN VALUE = 1125
VARIANCE = 85443
LOOP PROBABILITY = 0.01
Figure 2-6(a): Statistical properties of a loop Figure 2-5(b): Statistical properties of normal messages
Mailer 1
Mailer 2 Mailer 3
From:a@mail3 
To:loop@mail1 
Number:500 
Last:0:00:00 
lapses:[4,4,5.. 
Mean:4.33 
Var:0.22 
Loopprob:0.99
From:a@mail3 
To:ok1@mail1 
Number:50 
Last:11:50:20 
lapses:[5,200.. 
Mean:110 
Var:6500 
Loopprob:0.05
From:b@mail3 
To:ok2@mail1 
Number:45 
Last:16:30:02 
lapses:[200,5.. 
Mean:345 
Var:7000 
Loopprob:0.03
...
From:a@mail3 
To:loop@mai12
From:a@mail3 
To:loop@mai13
Observation point
12
3
n
Figure 2-7: Detection of suspect messages- 39 -
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well-defined string (containing, for instance, the mail relay identification plus an exact time value). 
The UIT of each suspicious SR pair will be recorded for further identification.
• Flush the message i.e. force the message to leave the mail relay again.
• Detect the tagged message. Wait for the tagged message to arrive again. The arrival of a message 
containing both a suspicious SR pair and an UIT means that the message has been processed twice 
by the mail relay with identical envelope addresses. This fact is an unequivocal loop symptom. If 
the envelope addresses were different, the presence of an UIT alone would not constitute a sufficient 
condition for this assertion since regular messages might be processed twice by a mail relay as a 
result of a user forward to an external address(2). 
• Remove the message loop. The immediate action to eliminate a message loop may consist in 
“bouncing” the message back to the sender with an error diagnostic or to discard the message and 
generate a report directed to the local E-mail administrator. Further actions must then be undertaken 
to diagnose and fix the actual reasons (configuration errors, protocol failures, etc.) of the loop.
5.1.5 Implementation Experience
The proposed loop detection and removal scenario has been fully implemented in two major mail relays of 
the University of Geneva: the main X.400 to SMTP gateway where loop problems were especially percep-
tible and an SMTP relay containing user mailboxes. Apart from a few message loops that were introduced 
for testing issues, both mail relays were subject to normal operating conditions.
During a small calibration period the heuristic function was fed with the parameters that best suited 
particular traffic conditions. After this period, the system was able to distinguish with remarkable accuracy 
looping messages from regular traffic. When combined to the mark and kill mechanism described above, 
the system succeeded to automatically eliminate any possible message loops. The full loop detection pack-
age was then integrated in the DMT architecture in such a way that the loop diagnosis process was triggered 
exclusively under particular system conditions (i.e. excessive message rate or disk usage).
The effectiveness of the whole scenario infrastructure (DMT architecture + loop handling) was 
demonstrated under real operating conditions. During this demonstration, the system successfully detected 
and removed, amongst others, a loop that had been inadvertently created by a user in the Geneva University 
domain.
5.1.6 Conclusions
During several months of utilization, the loop finder script has automatically detected and removed several 
message loops that in the past would have remained undetected for several days and might have caused se-
rious problems to the E-mail service. This shows that even the analysis of basic statistical parameters is suf-
ficient to distinguish looping messages from ordinary traffic.
Although the main objective of our work consisted in detecting and removing message loops, the 
accurate statistic information obtained, has brought significant insight into the E-mail traffic conditions of 
our site. In particular, relying on this information, we have operated important changes in the topology of 
1 The header record should be carefully chosen to allow multi-protocol inter-operability.
2 As a consequence of the address rewriting inherent to the forward process, the message enters and leaves 
the mail relay with different recipient addresses.- 40 -
5  Practical Management Scenariosour campus E-mail architecture resulting in an improved load balancing among message relays. Further-
more, the nature of information provided by this script can be easily exploited for accounting and billing 
issues.
Experience shows that in widely distributed and heterogeneous environments such as electronic 
mail, the recommendations of standard protocols are often not correctly implemented. Mail loops are a good 
example of a problem that theoretically should not happen but practically does. Furthermore, the incredible 
growth of E-mail utilization will certainly aggravate this problem. Techniques as the one described in this 
paper can detect malfunctions before the quality of service provided to end-users degrades.
5.2 Collaborative Domains Specific Scenarios
5.2.1 E-mail Loop Detection
The collaborative domain model provides a significant enhancement to the loop detection scenario de-
scribed in section §5.1 relying on the information correlation extracted from multiple domains involved in 
the loop (as long as they comply to the appropriate collaboration contracts). The following benefits of the 
collaboration need to be considered:
• A message may be seen as normal traffic when observed at a given domain and be considered sus-
picious under the traffic conditions of a different domain.
• The routing information present in the header of a message can be used to query involved domains 
for a potential looping candidate. The input information for this query would consist of the SR/Pair 
and the “loop probability” together with the absolute time of the last message.
• This mechanism would allow to trace back the message across multiple domains and provide a more 
accurate diagnostic than a stand-alone statistical analysis at a single domain.
• Note that this scenario can be achieved by exchanging standardized, MIB-like information (passive 
collaboration) together with very simple remote procedure calls.
5.2.2 Application-level connectivity
Collaborative domains can be applied to diagnose connectivity problems of application level services such 
as the www, e-mail, ftp, etc. In order to assess if a given target domain is reachable, a single connection from 
a given source domain would not provide sufficiently accurate information since the problem may be due to:
• A faulty connection between the source and the target domains.
• A packet filtering policy at the router or firewall level.
• Excessive delays due to network congestion, etc.
By correlating information provided by several domains trying to establish a connection to the target, one 
can increase the accuracy of the diagnostic. For instance, if a domain sitting in the same sub-network than 
the target (no firewall intervention) is able to establish a connection, network faults can be discarded where-
as firewall configuration can be suspected as the potential cause. It should be noted that, in this particular 
scenario, domain collaborations provide the ability to elaborate diagnostics by analyzing information ex-
tracted from outside domains exclusively, i.e. the external behavior of the target domain with its peers pro-
vide the necessary information to derive the problem cause.- 41 -
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The application of the collaborative domains model to distributed applications management opens a wide 
range of research directions and practical scenarios. From a theoretical perspective, a further effort would 
need to be devoted to analyze classical issues related to cooperative work ([49]) such as synchronization and 
coordination. When multiple domains are involved in complex management decisions, the application of 
distributed consensus algorithms ([74], [24]) would constitute a theoretical foundation to reach a multi-par-
ty agreements.
From a practical point of view, it would be interesting to apply this principle to other management 
scenarios such as bandwidth optimization between domains based on traffic analysis, computation of opti-
mal routes between domains for application-level transactions (e-mail, www, file transfers, etc.) inspired 
from the IP routing algorithms, etc.- 42 -
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1 The Existing Security Framework
The following sub-sections provide a brief introduction to a generic security framework: firstly, we 
present a classification of security services following the layered communications model. The second sub-
section provides a brief definition of major security services. Finally, we give a short description of the most 
common building blocks (such as cryptographic techniques, one-way functions, etc.) underlying the provi-
sion of these security services.
1.1 Layered Classification of Security Services
When talking about securing Internet exchanges, a major point of debate is where to place security services. 
The most significant categories in this direction are the following:
• At the network level and below: Security services are embedded in the network or link layers and 
enable packet protection between the encrypting and decrypting devices. The most significant ex-
ample of Network Level Security (NLS) is the security architecture for IPnG (IPSec, [4]) that pro-
poses a standardized way to provide confidentiality and authentication (and related services) to IP 
packets. The major advantage of this approach is that security can be provided transparently to the 
final user by hiding security related operations in the host’s operating system or in intermediate 
routing devices (encrypting and decrypting routers). This approach also allows to protect only those 
network segments that are more exposed (e.g. public Internet links) without penalizing the remain-
ing part of the packet route. As an example, most of the today Virtual Private Networks (VPNs, 
[93]) use network-level encryption when going across public networks. It should be noted that cryp-
tographic operations at this level are host-based rather than user-based; this means that from a data 
origin authentication perspective, NLS will not be able to answer the question who has sent this 
packet? but rather which host or which router has sent this packet?
• At the transport level: Transport Level Security (TLS) provides end-to-end transaction protection 
at the socket level; as a consequence, the socket’s owners at the source and destination hosts are 
responsible for the establishment of the cryptographic parameters (keys) involved in the encryption 
and decryption processes. This means that TLS, as opposed to NLS is user-based. Furthermore, 
TLS benefits from the genericity of the socket construction and provides an uniform secure inter-
face to every higher level application such as WWW, ftp, telnet, etc. The Transport Level Security 
Standard 1.1 ([31], see section §2.1.2) is the new (May 2007) Internet standard for security services 
at the transport level.
• At the application level: Security services are embedded in selected Internet applications such as 
electronic mail, remote login, www, etc. and, as a consequence, can be customized to the actual - 43 -
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for www transactions are well known examples of application level security services.
• On top of the TCP/IP layered communication model, a new category of hi-level protocols is emerg-
ing to suit the needs of electronic financial transactions. A quite representative example of this cat-
egory of protocols is SET (Secure Electronic Transactions [107]) which is the result of a coordinat-
ed effort driven by leading credit card vendors to deal with secure electronic payments over the In-
ternet. Similar integrated solutions exist for a number of real-life financial transactions such as cash 
payments, banking operations, voting schemes, auctions, etc.
1.2 Security Requirements for Transactions in Large Scale Networks
The emergence of new electronic services has resulted in new needs in terms of security. As a consequence, 
new security requirements have joined the classical authentication and confidentiality services. A list of the 
most common ones together with a definition and a summarized explanation of the mechanisms needed to 
achieve them is given below:
• Authentication: provides assurance of the identity of an entity involved in the transaction (entity 
authentication) or allows to affirm that a data item originates from a given entity (data origin au-
thentication). Entity authentication is usually obtained by explicitly providing a secret piece of data 
(password, secret key, PIN code, etc.) or by proving the knowledge of such a secret without disclos-
ing it (providing the hash code of a secret, using the private part of a public/private key pair, etc.). 
Data origin authentication is mostly obtained by encrypting the data (or a one-way function of it) 
with a secret key (either private or shared depending whether the underlying technology is asym-
metric or symmetric) owned by the originating party.
• Confidentiality: prevents unauthorized parties from accessing transaction’s contents. Confidenti-
ality is normally achieved by means of cryptographic transformations ruled by a given key. In sym-
metric key algorithms, the same secret key is used for encryption and decryption tasks. In asymmet-
ric systems, confidentiality is achieved through encrypting under the recipient public key while de-
cryption requires the use of the corresponding private key. 
• Integrity: protects transaction’s contents against modification by unauthorized parties. One-way 
hash functions (keyed and unkeyed) constitute the fundamental building block for preserving infor-
mation integrity. When using unkeyed hash functions, the result is in turn protected through encryp-
tion for preventing modifications by intruders. Note that data origin authentication usually provides 
integrity protection.
• Non-repudiation: prevents a communication party from falsely denying being involved in a trans-
action. Basically, it relies on data origin authentication with one important limitation: only the orig-
inator might have the ability to generate the transaction contents. As a result, asymmetric crypto-
system better meet the needs of non-repudiation than symmetric ones where the key is shared by the 
recipient who often takes part in the dispute.(1)
• Anonymity: Protects party’s identity from being disclosed. This protection is usually based on 
cryptographic transformations (blind signatures [22], digital pseudonyms and mixes [23]). Simpler 
solutions relying on the introduction of intermediate relays (anonymous remailers, anonymous 
1 The use of symmetric cryptosystem as a support for non-repudiation is usually assisted by Trusted Third 
Parties (TTP) that share secret keys with all the intervening principals and have the ability to arbitrate in case 
of disputes.- 44 -
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major importance with the emergence of payment protocols based on electronic cash.
• Availability: Ensures that system resources are accessible to legitimate users. A very important se-
curity requirement which is often neglected in security policies. The achievement of this service 
usually deals with thwarting denial of service attacks which might be harmful and difficult to detect. 
The analysis of the statistical properties of such attacks constitutes a suitable countermeasure al-
though appropriate protocol design “right from the start” like proposed in [92] constitutes a prefer-
able alternative.
Besides the specification of a set of security services, a security policy is also needed to precisely define the 
threats that a system is intended to address. An appropriate security policy should evaluate the effort in terms 
of security with respect to a) the value of the information to be protected and b) the resources available to a 
potential attacker. Furthermore, it should demarcate the responsibilities and the liabilities of the involved 
parties and define a non-complicit, independent system for audit and accounting that takes into account all 
the system parameters (not only the security-related ones). A good introduction to the issue of security pol-
icies can be found in [41] and a more detailed analysis in [124].
1.3 Building Blocks for Transactions’ Security
Cryptography constitutes the basic foundation of security service provision. In this section, a brief introduc-
tion of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography is provided together with a discussion of the pros and cons 
of both techniques. A short description of one-way functions that constitute an essential complement to 
cryptography in many applications is also provided. Finally, a description of the complementary structures 
needed for the cryptosystem to work is also presented.
1.3.1 Symmetric Cryptography
Since the famous Caesar Cipher (I BC) to the most commonly used today algorithms (AES [40], DES [38], 
IDEA [72], RC5 [105], etc.), symmetric cryptography has been the corner stone of information hiding tech-
niques. Symmetric cryptography, also named classical cryptography and single-key cryptography, relies on 
the use of a single key - that should be kept secret - for encryption and decryption operations. The set of 
transformations that are carried out on the data vary between algorithms but they usually consist in a com-
plex combination of substitution and transposition processes fully governed by the use of a key. Apart from 
those previously mentioned, there exists dozens of different cryptographic algorithms (see [80] and [110]
for a comprehensive survey) providing distinct level of security (although most of them are thought by their 
authors to be unbreakable...). Symmetric algorithms are usually fast and are often implemented in hardware 
in order to improve performance and reliability.
The primary use of symmetric cryptography is to preserve information confidentiality, but a proof 
of possession of the shared key is often considered as a valid means for entity authentication. Furthermore, 
since any modification on the ciphertext should be detected by the decryption process, symmetric cryptog-
raphy also serves as a base for integrity and data origin authentication.
The first drawback of symmetric cryptosystems resides in the need of a complementary secure 
channel (sealed envelope, secure telephone, etc.) allowing communicating parties to exchange the key with-
out compromising its secrecy. Another major disadvantage resides in the fact that the key is shared by com-
municating parties and, as a consequence, messages can be forged by any party so that they appear as if they 
were originated by any other entity sharing the key. Due to this fact, symmetric cryptography is usually not 
considered as an appropriate support for digital signatures and non-repudiation services.- 45 -
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The invention of asymmetric cryptography (also named public key cryptography) in 1976 by W. Diffie and 
M. Hellman [32] certainly was the most remarkable event in the history of modern cryptography. Asymmet-
ric cryptography obviates the need to share, and thus exchange, secrets between parties involved in a secret 
communication. As a consequence, the key transport and agreement techniques are largely simplified since 
only the authenticity of public keys needs to be preserved. 
Basically, public key cryptography relies on asymmetrical properties of certain mathematical com-
putations. As an example, Diffie-Hellman [32] and ElGamal [36] schemes are based on the fact that modular 
exponentiation is rather easy whereas discrete logarithm (the inverse operation) is computationally intrac-
table when very big numbers are considered. The RSA scheme [101] relies on the practical difficulty to fac-
tor big numbers, a problem that has intrigued mathematicians for centuries. The most recent public-key al-
gorithm is the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [40], based on the computation complexity inherent to a 
particular algebraic structure, an elliptic curve (an equation of the form y2 = x3 + a x + b) over very large 
finite fields. One of the most notable advantages of this technique resides in the fact that it provides equiv-
alent cryptographic strength compared to RSA or Diffie-Hellman with significantly smaller key sizes (ratios 
range from 1:6 to 1:30 depending on the key lengths). Recent efforts have been devoted to adapt ECC tech-
nology to widely deployed security protocols such as Transport Level Security (TLS) [12].
In general, asymmetric cryptography algorithms are significantly slower than their symmetric coun-
terparts (around 100 times in software [71] and 1000 times in hardware implementations [14]). As a conse-
quence, when using encryption to provide confidentiality, asymmetric technology is usually restricted to en-
crypt symmetric keys. These keys serve as input to fast symmetric algorithms that, in turn, protect the trans-
action core. When using public-key technology as a support for digital signatures, the performance issue is 
overcome by signing the result of a one way function (see next paragraph) applied to the message contents 
instead of signing the whole message. 
Although asymmetric cryptography obviates the need of a confidential channel to exchange secret 
keys, the association between an entity and its corresponding public key should be cryptographically bound. 
In most cases this secure association is provided by a so called certificate or public key certificate generated 
by a Certification Authority or CA (see section §1.3.4 for more details on CAs and trusted third parities in 
general). A survey on certification techniques is also provided in section §2.2.
1.3.3 One-way functions
Also named hash functions, message digests and fingerprints, one-way functions constitute an essential 
complement to encryption in most of current security solutions. The fundamental property of one way func-
tion resides in the fact that it is computationally intractable to find the pre-image of a given value. In other 
words, if F is a one way function, and a a given value, it is unfeasible to find M such that F(M) = a. Further-
more, if a one-way function is applied to a given input, the result of this process cannot possibly equal the 
output of the function for a different input (collision-freeness) and this includes eventual modifications of 
the original. One-way function also act as compression instruments since the output of the functions is sig-
nificantly smaller (normally under 256 bits) than the pieces of informations that serve as input. Keyed one-
way functions, also known as message authentication codes (MAC) work in a similar way except that the 
function output is also dependent of a secret key. The presence of this secret key prevents attackers from 
seamlessly modifying the result of a one-way function after altering the data.(1)
1 Note that an equivalent functionality is obtained by encrypting the result of the one way function with a sym-
metric cryptosystem- 46 -
1  The Existing Security FrameworkOne way functions rely on complex mathematical computations that usually combine linear and 
non-linear operations over several iterations. The most widely known one-way hash functions are the Mes-
sage Digest (MD) family and particularly, MD5 [99] and the Secure Hash Algorithm from the Digital Sig-
nature Standard [87]. Recent developments ([8], [134], [135]) show that most widely used cryptographic 
hash functions such as MD5 and SHA-1 are vulnerable to near collision and collision attacks. As of today 
(May 2007), the SHA-2 family of functions [39] composed by SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-
512 appears as a secure alternative because of the increased digest length. 
The range of application of one-way functions is quite large but their use it is mostly associated with 
authentication and integrity purposes. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, one-way functions are a 
valuable means for reducing computational overhead in signature operations based on asymmetric technol-
ogy. Keyed one way functions provide both data origin authentication and integrity without extra encryp-
tion.
1.3.4 Third Parties
When two users wish to establish a secure association (authenticated and confidential) they should go 
through an initial key agreement. Depending on the selected technology (symmetric or asymmetric) they 
may choose: a) to exchange a secret key using a secure channel (such as a sealed envelope) or b) to authen-
ticate their public keys by means of a tamper-proof channel (such as telephone or voice mail). This prelim-
inary step does not result in major administrative problems when small and closely related groups of users 
are concerned. However, for large and loosely connected populations like Internet users this solution is un-
practical.
In these environments, where “manual” key agreement is difficult to achieve, there is a need for sup-
porting infrastructures acting as trusted intermediaries. The role of these entities is determined by the select-
ed technology (symmetric or asymmetric):
• In symmetric cryptosystems, trusted intermediaries (also known as Trusted Third Parties (TTP) and 
Key Distribution Centers (KDC)) distribute secret keys to involved parties so that they can establish 
secure communications. When all the communicating parties are located under a single administra-
tive domain, the corresponding TTP shares a key with each party (e.g. the login password or a one-
way function of it). The TTP will use this key to establish a secure communication channel with all 
the involved parties. This secure channel will vehicle all the necessary security parameters to allow 
parties to communicate securely. The inter-domain case requires secret sharing between corre-
sponding TTPs (they should trust each other) but the underlying mechanism is similar to the intra-
domain one. These techniques are described more in depth in [88]. A good example of how these 
techniques are effectively implemented in real-world security protocols is Kerberos (see section 
§2.1.3). 
• The role of trusted intermediaries in asymmetric cryptosystems mostly consists in providing an au-
thenticated binding between a user and his public key. The piece of information containing this 
binding is known as a certificate and the trusted intermediaries generating certificates are named 
Certification Authorities or CAs. The certificate issuing process require both a proof of identity
(such as the physical presence, an identity card or a driving license) and a proof of possession of the 
corresponding private key. The public key contained by the certificate will serve both as a means to 
validate private key operations (e.g. in case of entity authentication, digital signature, etc.) and to 
send secret data to the certificate holder. Both operations assume that the communicating partners 
trust the certificate and the issuer CA. 
Each CA has a pair (eventually several pairs) of private/public keys; the private part being employed 
to digitally sign all the certificates issued by a given CA and the public key being used by principals - 47 -
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sibly competing) CAs wish to verify the authenticity of their public keys. The seminal idea propos-
ing a hierarchical network of certification authorities as a solution for inter-domain key authentica-
tion appeared in [9] and the first application of this architecture to electronic mail security was pro-
posed in [73].
Classification of Third Parties
An interesting classification of third parties is based on the role they play during the establishment and fur-
ther evolution of a secure transaction between involved principals. Three major categories can be defined:
• In-line: The third party acts as a real-time intermediary between A and B which means that every 
packet corresponding to the secure transaction must go through the third party. An example of an 
in-line third party is a cryptographic relay (or proxy) achieving encryption (respectively decryption) 
of outgoing (resp. incoming) transactions within a given domain or administrative border. Note that 
in-line third parties should be permanently available.
• On-line. The third party is involved in real time in the establishment of a secure channel even though 
principals communicate directly once they hold the appropriate cryptographic parameters. The 
availability of the third party is needed at the start up phase but is not necessary during the commu-
nication between principals. A good example of third parties having an on-line behaviour are Ker-
beros Authentication Servers (see section §2.1.3).
• Off-line: The third party prepares information a priori but which remains imperative for the secure 
communication to take place. Once principals hold this piece of information (as long as it remains 
valid) the secure communication may occur safely without any real-time intervention of the third 
party. A well known example of an off-line third party are Certification Authorities (CAs) in most 
existing PKCS.
The main advantage of the off-line behavior versus the two other categories resides in the fact that there is 
no need for the third party to be available during the communication. However, it suffers from manageability 
problems when dealing with revocation of rights since valid certificates may need to be revoked under cer-
tain circumstances (e.g. due to a secret compromise).
For a general description of the role of third parties and their classification see [43] and [80].
1.3.5 Other Supporting services
Naming Services
A very important issue that is closely related to the process of key distribution and certification is naming. 
In large scale environments as the Internet, there is a manifest need for a coordinated naming service allow-
ing an unique and unequivocal identification of principals. Certain security solutions like PGP [140] rely on 
e-mail addresses as the fundamental building block to design principals; the major problem of this approach 
being the volatility of e-mail addresses with respect to principal names. The International Standard Organi-
zation (ISO) and the CCITT introduced X.500 series which brought forward the idea of using qualified 
names to design principals in a coordinated and universal directory [57]. The X.509 standard describes how 
principal authentication can be achieved within this framework, together with a specification of a format for 
certificates. The original X.509 has been selected as a support for key and principal authentication by many 
integrated Internet security solutions (see section §2). A more recent work proposes the use existing Internet 
services such as the Domain Name System (DNS, [83],[84]) as a means to provide naming facilities to end-
users. The so called Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSsec, [35]) propose to enhance the ex-- 48 -
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anteed. The resulting service may, thus, be considered as an appropriate support for key distribution.
Time-stamping Services
Those protocols that rely on time synchronization for thwarting replay attacks like described in [30]
may need to rely on a Coordinated Time Service allowing intervening parties to be synchronized so that mes-
sage freshness can be easily distinguished. Another supporting service also dealing with the notion of time 
is Digital Timestamping [51]. This service provides secure timestamping of documents using linking tech-
niques amongst several documents in such a way that any change (including date) becomes immediately ap-
parent.
1.3.6 Key Establishment Protocols
Key establishment is the process whereby a shared secret becomes available for two or more parties for sub-
sequent cryptographic use. A key establishment protocol usually intends to provide short-term keys (also 
called session keys) to every communicating party that will serve as a basis for authentication and secrecy 
of successive exchanges.
The use of different short-term keys for every transaction is considered a good security practice 
since it prevents attackers from collecting large amounts of ciphertext encrypted with the master key and, 
as a consequence, reduces the risk of successful cryptanalysis. Protocols such as Kerberos [123], SSL [89], 
PGP [140], and many others rely on short term keys for securing the core of individual transactions.
The reliability of a security protocol in case of disclosure of long term secrets (also called master 
secrets) constitutes also a very important issue: a protocol is said to have Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) if 
compromise of long-term keys does not compromise the secrecy of past transactions. PFS is a quite inter-
esting property since it “locks in the past” all the secure transactions that have preceded the disclosure of the 
master secret. A passive attacker collecting all the packets related to a secure transaction will not ever be 
able to recover the plaintext even if he gets to know the master secrets of any of the involved parties. In order 
to obtain PFS, it is essential that the session key is not explicitly exchanged (even encrypted) between par-
ties. The session key is usually the result of a combination of independent pseudo-random computations car-
ried out in real-time by all the communicating parties. Unfortunately most of the currently available inte-
grated security solutions (including the above mentioned examples) have not been designed with PFS in 
mind.
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange [32] provided that only short-term exponentials are used, is a 
good example of a key establishment protocol providing PFS. The Station-to-Station (STS) protocol de-
scribed in [33] proposes a key establishment solution providing PFS and solving the Diffie-Hellman vulner-
ability to man-in-the-middle attacks through the use of signed exponentials. This protocol constitutes the ba-
sic building block of the Oakley protocol [92], a key establishment scheme designed for the IPnG security 
architecture, which also provides PFS.
• Key establishment is a process or protocol whereby a shared secret becomes available for two or 
more parties for subsequent cryptographic use. Key establishment = key transport + key agree-
ment
• Key transport: a party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value and securely transfers it to the 
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contributed by, or associated with, each of these, (ideally) such that no party can predetermine the 
resulting value.
• Key authentication (also called implicit key authentication) is the property whereby one party is 
assured that no other party aside from a specifically identified second party may gain access to a 
particular secret key.
• Key confirmation is the property whereby one party is assured that second (possibly unidentified) 
party actually has possession of a particular secret key.
• Explicit key authentication is the property obtained when both (implicit) key authentication and 
key confirmation hold.
• Perfect Forward Secrecy: A protocol is said to have perfect forward secrecy if compromise of 
long-term keys does not compromise past session keys
2 Internet Security: State of the Art
This section deals with the most relevant Internet security solutions. Based on the fact that the number of 
security related protocols and solutions exceeds the one hundred mark, we outline in this session the most 
important ones. The selection criteria was mainly based on their deployment significance and their relevance 
to this work.
2.1 Integrated Solutions
2.1.1 IPSec
IP Security Protocol or IPSec [65] is a set of security features that was developed initially as a fundamental 
component of IPv6, the successor of the present version 4 of the Internet Protocol. Due to the late adoption 
of IPv6 and the urgent need of security enhancements for IPv4, IPSec was adapted to work on top of the 
IPv4 set of standards. The security services provided by IPSec are basically access control, integrity, authen-
tication, replay protection and confidentiality.
The fundamental building blocks of IPSec are the following:
• Network-level security protocols: These two protocols provide security enhancements at the IP da-
tagram level (from the IP source to the IP destination hosts). The Authentication Header (AH) pro-
vides data origin authentication, connection less integrity and replay protection whereas the Encap-
sulating Security Payload (ESP) provides the same services supported by AH plus host-to-host con-
fidentiality trough the use of encryption algorithms.
• Internet Security Associations (SA): defines a connection that include all the services and mecha-
nisms needed to protect traffic within a core security protocol (AH or ESP) such as encryption and 
authentication algorithms, short-lived keying material, host-oriented or user-oriented certificates.
• Key Establishment Protocols: The most relevant are: a) the OAKLEY protocol [92] based on the 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm and providing perfect forward secrecy for keys, identity 
protection, and authentication and b) the SKEME protocol [67] also ensures anonymity, repudiabil-
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sociations between IPSec peers and handles key establishment protocols. IKE [53] is a very com-
plex protocol that has recently be updated to into IKEv2 [64].
IPSec has gained very significant acceptance and has become a de-facto standard to provide network level 
security. A number of proprietary Virtual Private Networks protocols have been dropped in favour of IPsec.
2.1.2 Transport Level Security Protocol
Transport Level Security (TLS) is an Internet standard resulting from the evolution of the Secure Socket 
Layer Protocol (SSL [89]) developed by Netscape Inc. This protocol provides end-to-end confidentiality, 
authentication and integrity on top of the transport layer (tcp/udp). It provides security services to www 
transactions and is probably the most widely used security protocol in the world. As a transport level proto-
col, it can be used to protect other applications such as e-mail, ftp, remote login, etc. From a functional per-
spective, TLS is composed by the following entities:
• The record protocol: managing the encapsulation of higher level datagrams (application and session 
level) and dealing with the fragmentation, compression and encryption parts. It works with most 
popular encryption algorithms including ECC.
• The handshake protocol which deals with entity authentication and the secret key establishment be-
tween parties.
• The state machine: Unlike http, TLS is a stateful protocol which deals with a number of variables 
holding information about ongoing sessions and connections.
Although TLS has been designed to support mutual (client and server) authentication, only the server is usu-
ally authenticated via a public key certificate. This certificate is validated at the client side by a number of 
widely spread certification authorities hardcoded in most popular browsers. If the certificate cannot be val-
idated, the client will be notified via a pop-up window. Unfortunately, this validation mechanism can be sub-
verted by malware executed at the client side in a transparent way to the end user. Advanced phising tech-
niques use this method in order to deceive users and inadvertently obtain sensitive information.
Version 1.1 of TLS [31] has recently been released (April 2006) with some minor changes and cor-
rections and it’s being adopted by most software publishers.
2.1.3 Kerberos
The Kerberos Network Authentication Service is a trusted third-party authentication protocol designed for 
TCP/IP Networks, based on the Needham and Schroeder authentication protocol [88] and on the modifica-
tions proposed by Denning and Sacco [30]. The main objective of Kerberos is to provide authentication and 
confidentiality to transactions taking place between a set of entities sitting on a network although the typical 
Kerberos scenario consists in securing client-server relationships. In this section we will give an overview 
of versions 4 and 5 which are conceptually equivalent but different in terms of functionality and flexibility. 
Those readers willing to go deeply into the Kerberos protocol may wish to consult [45], [63], [110].
Kerberos is based on symmetric cryptography although recent work is in progress to provide meth-
ods for using public key algorithms ([139], [128]). The Kerberos model consists of a set of distributed enti-
ties -clients and servers- and a centralized database keeping the clients’ secret keys. This database is con-
ventionally encrypted (usually with DES) using a master key that is known only to the server. Recent re-
search efforts have shown how Kerberos domains may be combined with public-key based techniques to 
provide WWW security [29] and large scale authentication [109].- 51 -
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conventional username/password interaction. The successive exchanges between the Kerberos client (the 
client side of the Kerberos system) and the Kerberos server(1) leading to a secure association between A and 
B are summarized in Fig. 3-1. It should be noted that the user’s master key Ka is determined to the user pass-
word and that this key is kept in memory only until obtaining a limited-lifetime session key Sa. This is con-
sidered a good security practise since it reduces the exposure of long lasting secrets to insider’s attacks (peo-
ple running processes on the client host).
Kerberos Realms
The mostly centralized Kerberos model presents serious deficiencies in terms of scalability when applied to 
large networks. On one hand, there is the need for robust mirroring and replication techniques (which are 
easier to design than to actually implement) for coping with the classical performance and reliability prob-
lems resulting from the existence of a single Kerberos Server. But most importantly, there is the practical 
difficulty to find a single entity to trust amongst a large population of users possibly belonging to different 
organizations. In this sense, it should be reminded that the Kerberos server (and thus, the system adminis-
trator sitting behind) knows every master key and consequently has access to all information addressed to a 
given user and may also impersonate his identity in any transaction.
To address this issue, Kerberos introduces the notion of realms. A realm is a set of entities ruled by 
a single Kerberos Server and consequently, by a single database of master keys. Two entities located (and 
authenticated) at different realms can establish secure associations if the corresponding Kerberos Servers 
have a common master key and thus, trust each other. In this case, the entity initiating the transaction asks 
the local Kerberos Server for the inter-realm credentials needed to authenticate on behalf of the remote Ker-
1 A distinction is often made to designate what we name generally a Kerberos Server: the terms Authentication Server 
(AS), Ticket Granting Server (TGS) or a Key Distribution Server (KDC) are used to indicate a more specific functionality. 
Actually, these different notations are mostly due to historical reasons since they all participate in very similar protocol 
exchanges and need to access the same kind of secret information.
Request for Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) 
TGT encrypted with A Master Key
Request for Ticket for B using: TGT + A Authenticator
Ticket for B encrypted with B Master Key
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cure association with the remote user. In version 4, trust relationships between realms may only be expressed 
in a peer to peer way and are not transitive.
Kerberos Version 5
Kerberos version V is a major review of version 4 although the basic principles of the protocol remain un-
changed. The fundamental aim of this release was to enhance the flexibility of the protocol so it could run 
on top on several networks (not only TCP/IP as in version 4) and use a richer set of cryptographic algorithms 
(not only DES). As a first step, a high level specification language (ASN.1) was selected as a a basic building 
block for describing and encoding protocol exchanges. Obviously the price to pay is a significant overhead 
in terms of performance and a higher complexity. Both factors are seriously penalizing the global acceptance 
of this version of Kerberos. 
Other major enhancements of Kerberos are the support of delegation of authentication even through 
different realms, a more flexible policy for handling tickets (tickets may be renewed, forwarded and even 
proxyed between peers) and a more elaborated realms architecture (although very complicated and difficult 
to actually implement) supporting hierarchical distribution of realms and authentication transitivity between 
realms. Finally Kerberos 5 fixes some potential flaws of version 4 such as password-guessing attacks in the 
initial authentication phase and proposes specific performance improvements, such as avoiding double en-
cryption when possible.
Kerberos has become highly popular since it was adopted by Microsoft as one of the authentication 
standards for Windows XP.
Kerberos Problems
In a seminal paper [5], Bellovin and Merritt describe several Kerberos problems such as password guessing 
risks and limitations in the scope of tickets that were (at least partially) solved in version 5. However, other 
restrictions stated in this thesis such as the generality of Kerberos to secure generic transactions remain val-
id. More precisely, Kerberos was basically designed as a means to provide authentication and privacy in a 
client-server environment and its adequacy to suit the needs of classical user-to-user applications, such as 
electronic mail, has been rightly questioned. Some limitations related to the way master and session keys 
were handled in user-to-user transactions were fixed in version 5 but significant weaknesses remain. In our 
opinion, the exclusive use of symmetric cryptography constitutes a serious drawback for users sitting in 
loosely connected environments. Theoretically, a trust path between source and destination realms can be 
established so intervening users may obtain a shared key. Unfortunately, this trust path requires that every 
intermediate realm from source to destination, shares a secret key with his neighbor. Obviously this results 
in a significant administrative burden for unconnected realms. Furthermore, it has unpleasant security im-
plications since the fact of sharing a key between two Kerberos Servers located at different realms implies 
that inter-realm authentication becomes possible and this can be an undesirable side-effect in some cases.
Another important drawback resulting from the use of symmetric cryptography results in the imper-
ative need to keep cryptographically and physically secure the database containing all the master keys under 
the responsibility of a given server; obviously, this also applies to every replicated instance of both the server 
and the database. Moreover, the fact that users share a key in their secure communications excludes non-
repudiation since any of the two users (and even a dishonest Kerberos Server) may have originated the trans-
action.
More generally, we believe that the approach presented in this thesis offers higher flexibility. One 
one hand, this is due to the use of public key cryptography that allows secure exchanges without trusted in-- 53 -
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from the Kerberos design brings forward very interesting possibilities especially between loosely connected 
environments. Finally, it is noteworthy that the idea of Kerberos realm presents some similarities with the 
notion of domain presented in this thesis and inter-realm authentication can be considered as a degree of 
domain collaboration. However, we consider that Kerberos model is better suited to closely related, well 
controlled environments than to generic, loosely connected Internet environments as those addressed by our 
work.
2.2 Certification Systems
We present in this section a short overview of today’s most relevant certification systems. 
2.2.1 X.509 and PGP
The corner stone of a successful implementation of an asymmetric cryptosystem resides in the authenticated 
link between parties and public keys. Amongst others, two different solutions have gained major acceptance 
to address this issue: the Pretty Good Privacy PGP web of trust [140] relies on trust relationships between 
intervening parties that certify the authenticity of peers’ public keys. The second alternative is built upon 
Certification authorities or CAs that certify user’s public keys located under their jurisdiction. Other ap-
proaches of minor relevance are: a) authentication trees as a support for key authenticity and b) the use of 
specific mechanisms for integrating authentication elements in the public key itself such as Identity-based 
systems and Implicitly-certified public keys. These techniques are described in depth in [80].
From a topological perspective, the certification infrastructure has evolved from the strict hierarchi-
cal model defined in the ITU X.509 standard [62] to a more flexible structure allowing for cross-certifica-
tion, certification bridges and new extended attributes inherent to classical Internet applications (e-mail ad-
dresses, www names, etc.). A recently reviewed Internet standard [54] defines the use of X.509 certificates 
in Internet environments.
The issue of revocation, often mentioned as the Achilles heel of Public Key Infrastructures has also 
evolved. From the Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) introduced in the X.509 and often neglected in real 
world implementations, to the so called, Online Certificate Status Protocol OCSP [85], allowing to instan-
taneously corroborate the validity of a certificate. In [86], Naor proposes an alternative to increase the effi-
ciency and scalability of the traditional CRLs.
2.2.2 SDSI/ SPKI
SDSI/SPKI is a joint effort by Ron Rivest for SDSI [100]. and C. Ellison for SPKI [37]. 
The initial motivation of this work was to address the excessive complication of X.509 infrastruc-
tures. SDSI/SPKI is based on linked local names rather than a hierarchical global name space where each 
principal is a certification authority (as in the PGP model) and certificates can be created and signed by all 
participating entities. Flexible certificate signatures provide for expiration dates, joint signing and periodic 
re-confirmation. A sequence of certificates can form a chain, where definitions cascade and rights flow. A 
significant simplification comes also from the proposed description language, the "S-expressions", a much 
simpler syntax than ASN.1 used to define X.509 certificates.
The main advantage of SDSI/SPKI relies on its bottom-up approach where networks of trusts can 
be easily created having the user as the starting point. Besides its theoretical interest, this initiative has had 
limited impact in the enterprise world.- 54 -
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This initiative was first proposed by Adi Shamir [111] but the first workable solution is due to Dan Boneh 
and Matt Franklin [13]. 
IBE simplifies certification/revocation by using arbitrary character strings as public keys. For ex-
ample, the string "This is bob@bobscorp.com public key, valid until 16/03/05" would be a valid public key 
under the IBE assumptions. The corresponding private key is generated from a global master secret and dis-
tributed to legitimate parties by a central entity called the Private Key Generator (PKG) upon successful 
authentication. Due to the fact that the PKG acts as a key escrow agent (controls all the private keys), this 
approach is better suited to corporate environments than to individuals sitting at disjoint Internet domains.
2.3 Trust Management
The notion of trust and the way it is understood and managed is the basic foundation of any certification 
topology or Public Key Infrastructure in general. When two principals establish a certification path, they 
need to have previously established a trust relationship. This trust has many different aspects and character-
istics that have been widely studied and analyzed by a number of authors:
• Trust valuation: The deployment of the trust relationships inherent to a certification topology needs 
a metric to quantify trustworthiness between different principals. A quantitative refinement of the 
notion of trust based on a probabilistic approach has been presented by Maurer [77], Huitema [127]
and Beth [7]). An evaluation of several approaches by Reiter can be found in [96].
• Trust granularity: The most relevant work with respect to trust granularity is due to Yahalom [136]. 
He stresses the fact that the notion of trust is too coarse and finer granularity sub-notions are needed 
(such as the trust for generating random numbers or keeping secrets) and provides a flexible means 
to express trust relationships between entities. However, this work is not well adapted to the behav-
ior of Certification Authorities since it doesn’t address the certificate revocation and timely collab-
orations issues.
• Evidence as a requirement for trust: Crispo [25] investigates on the need to collect evidence in order 
to increase the trustworthiness of the Internet as a commercial marketplace. He claims that trust 
should be built on top of a well founded guarantee that will safeguard the users against frauds at-
tempts and malicious behaviours.
2.4 Other Works in Domain-Based Security
In [137] and [138], N.Yialelis presents an integrated solution for domain-based security services in distrib-
uted systems. This work describes a security architecture supporting access control specified in terms of do-
mains with special emphasis in access control policies and delegation of access rights. Relying on a power-
ful and flexible domain infrastructure essentially inherited from [112] and mostly on symmetric cryptogra-
phy for the sake of performance, it aims to provide secure channels (encrypted and authenticated) “à la 
Kerberos” between entities sitting on a distributed system. In our opinion, this effort represents a remarkable 
contribution in the understanding of the domain concept and domain relationships but presents similar draw-
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Despite a number of concrete solutions detailed in the previous section, the global deployment of security 
services remains at its infancy. This section analyzes a) the present situation, e.g. the achievements that have 
been reached in this direction and b) the open issues that, in our opinion, will be determining factors in the 
global deployment of transactions’ security.
3.1 Present Deployment of Secure Transactions
The considerable effort that has been devoted to information security in the last two decades has resulted in 
a significant degree of cryptographic maturity in terms of underlying algorithms. Both symmetric and asym-
metric technologies rely in a large set of cryptographic algorithms (c.f. section §1) that have proven resistant 
to extensive cryptanalysis. Beyond legal restrictions currently enforced in some countries, it can be stated 
that solid cryptographic ground for Internet secure transactions exists.
Concerning the cryptographic technology, public key algorithms seem to be the preferred to their 
symmetric counterparts as a basis for achieving secure transactions in the Internet. Symmetric cryptosys-
tems remain present for intra-domain authentication purposes mostly due to historical reasons and to their 
better manageability, especially when dealing with privilege revocation.
As for security solutions, a very broad choice of possibilities (see section §2) exist according to spe-
cific needs. Different protocols ranging from network-level security for protecting network packets to ap-
plication-oriented solutions securing selected internet applications.
In the network-level category, the IPSec standardization trend appears as the most promising direc-
tion despite the deployments problems of IPv6. As a result, the significance of IPSec in the universe of net-
work tunneling protocols has clearly put aside the proprietary enterprise VPN solutions that were widely 
present during the first Internet years.
Even if network-level security will continue to have a precise domain of application, the well known 
concept of "building secure transactions over an insecure network prevails". In this direction, a whole range 
of possibilities exist although only a few of them are gaining wide acceptance in selected fields of applica-
tions. Good examples of this are: TLS which has become the de-facto standard for transport-level security, 
PGP and S/MIME which are quite popular in the field of e-mail security and SSH which is the prevailing 
option for securing telnet transactions.
As for hi-level financial transactions, the Secure Electronic Transactions (SET) initiative launched 
by major credit card issuers to prevent on-line fraud had little success because of the excessive complexity 
and the "too much, too soon effect". Later efforts such as Verified by Visa and Mastercard Securecode are 
being deployed by the time of this work. The www sites of the involved credit card issuers are the most up 
to date knowledge sources to further explore these initiatives.
Although there are significant differences between security solutions belonging to these three cate-
gories, they all share the need of a sound key management policy ruling the cryptographic exchanges. Ac-
tually, the rather slow deployment of most of the above mentioned security solutions is mostly due to the 
lack of such a policy at a global level. In fact, as the time of this work, the subject of the Public Key Infra-
structure is still subject to intensive debate an none of the leading initiatives has established itself as a global 
solution. While PGP enjoys great popularity in closed groups of users, it presents serious deficiencies when 
dealing with user communities where the PGP’s distributed trust notion is difficult to be put into practise. - 56 -
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fails to provide adequate support in inter-domain environments due to the difficulty to apply hierarchical 
concepts in a flat (peer-to-peer) world of certification authorities. The SDSI/SPKI approach, still at a very 
early stage is, like PGP, is better adapted to closed environments due to the local nature of principal names.
In the absence of such a global certification infrastructure, most of today security protocols (includ-
ing the SSL/TLS suite securing www transactions) rely on "patched" solutions that basically hard-code cer-
tificates of widely popular companies (such as Verisign, Microsoft Root Certificate Authority, Thawte, etc.) 
on the client side (mainly in the Internet browser). These certificates serve as a basis to validate the server 
public keys that are then used to establish the secret key material between both principals (client and server). 
Regarding client authentication, the unfortunately popular userid/password combination is (unfortunately) 
still predominant. When strong authentication is required, the most common approach is to deploy tamper-
proof proprietary devices offering hardware support for one time passwords, challenge and response proto-
cols and locally deployed certificate-based authentication. 
In summary the global deployment of security services still has a long way to go and the obstacles 
will be structural rather algorithmic. Obviously, new algorithms and cryptographic schemes will emerge and 
eventual breaches may appear in existent ones but the main problem will reside in the global distribution 
and management of certificates. 
3.2 Current Issues
The main issues that have prevented a global deployment of security services in Internet transactions are the 
following:
• Lack of a global certification infrastructure. Although relevant efforts from both the academical 
and commercial worlds are being conducted in order to provide the Internet with an appropriate se-
curity architecture, the results from a global point of view are quite unsatisfactory. Firstly, the de-
ployment of a certification infrastructure has been seriously hindered by compliance defects in the 
proposed public key infrastructure [28]. Furthermore, the absence of an effective revocation policy 
has resulted in significant management problems in those organizations where local certification 
structures were deployed.  
As a result, a number of international organizations have united to form the so called Global Cer-
tificate Authority Form (GCAF, [47]) which aims at providing the common ground for a multina-
tional certification authority.
• Deployment and Management Issues. Strong end-to-end "security capabilities for all" results in 
very serious issues in terms of deployment (we might be talking about several billion certificates 
with today’s Internet users figures). Distributing keys to end-users appears as a more sound ap-
proach for clearly defined environments such as enterprise clients, certificate-based national iden-
tities, where the deployment and management of certificates (especially the very complex aspects 
of revocation) can be done in a "local" basis. The distribution of end-user keys at a global level as 
foreseen by the designers of the initial certificate standardization efforts has proved unrealistic.
• Complexity and user awareness: When evaluating the security risks, users may be reluctant to 
have a global public key with worldwide significance. Furthermore, in most cases, users are neither 
competent nor willing to understand the consequences of irresponsibly managing their cryptograph-
ic material and, in particular the private keys that uniquely identify them. In [28], Davis elaborates 
on the hidden management complexity inherent to managing keying material in a Public Key In-
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A summary of the proposed solutions mostly concerning structural changes, protocol modifications and key 
granularity issues
• Structural Recommendations in the security-related network. Reduce the gap between communi-
cation links and trust links. Bring the security-related parameters closer to the end user as an add-
on service. This facilitates deployment and management. 
Bringing certificates closer to the "user space" provides a better support to improve certificate fresh-
ness and to facilitate revocation.
• Enhance and Refine the role played by (local) Certification Authorities. In its present state, 
most of the administrative work is delegated to the end-users which causes problems as explained 
in the Davis paper [28]. In particular, the practical difficulty to test public key of remote CAs that 
appear in a certificate. According to our view, this task should be delegated to the CA.
• Enforce Domain Collaborations: Generally speaking, we consider that intra-domain security is 
widely deployed and its inherent management problems well contained (user authentication, access 
control, etc.). Outside the domain borders, a number of well mastered security protocols and tech-
niques (firewall, Secure Gateways, VPNs, etc.) have also been successfully deployed. The idea be-
hind the collaborative domains for security purposes is to combine Intra and Inter domain approach-
es to secure hi-level transactions. Intra-domain cryptographic parameters are used within domains 
while domain based (coarser granularity) parameters are used in inter-domain transactions.
• Enforce flat rather than hierarchical CAs relationship. Links between Certifications Authorities 
are mainly based on two principles: trust and manageability. Both concepts tend to fade when they 
flow across transitively connected entities, even if they have hierarchical dependencies.
• Develop CA collaborations. As mentioned in the first part of this work referred to the management 
of distributed applications, collaborations across multiple domains provide significant enhance-
ments in terms of manageability. Applying this principle to the management of a certification infra-
structure, we unveil a finer control of the certificates and, as a result, an increased reliability of the 
security architecture.
• Variable Key Granularity resulting in higher Flexibility. Thanks to the new structure, choosing 
the right level of key granularity becomes possible. The main benefit of introducing coarser key 
granularity to secure inter-domain transactions resides in the fact generalized encryption is achieved 
with very low management costs. Fine key granularity (on a user basis) can be deployed at the intra-
domain level. If we establish a parallel with global naming conventions in the real world, there’s no 
such a thing as a "perfectly global identity" since different administrations provide a local proof of 
identity to their citizens (a passport). Then they mutually establish a certain degree of trust, collab-
oration and administrative and physical controls to verify passport validity. Applied to our domain 
infrastructure, we obtain what we call domain-based global identity.
• Incrementality. Domain-based security is easier to deploy due to the coarser granularity. It may 
represent a first step towards a global security architecture. Native user-based granularity is one step 
forward with added management complexity. As a result, it is preferable to advocate for incremental 
deployment rather than suffering from the “all or nothing effect”.- 58 -
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In this section, we first provide an analysis of the existing certification infrastructure and its consequences 
in the issue of certificate revocation and validation. Then we give a set of recommendations covering both 
structural criteria and key granularity.
5.1 Analysis of the Current Certification Infrastructure
The main problems affecting the current certification structure are based on the lack of synchronization be-
tween the certification network and the so called core network (where transactions and real-life trust paths 
occur). This causes serious issues when reflecting actual trust links in the certification infrastructure as well 
as problems in the process of certificate acquisition, verification and revocation.
The Internet is heading towards a separation between the core network and the certification network. This 
fact results from the emergence of multiple certification companies and the reluctancy of organizations and 
Internet service providers to run their own CAs. A logical separation appears between the core network and 
the certification network
When Alice needs to be authenticated for an Internet transaction at a global level, she will probably 
be asked to obtain a certificate from a certification authority. If the she works for a company running a Cer-
tification Authority(1) she may easily obtain it, otherwise she will have to contact a commercial certification 
company. As pointed out by C.Neuman in [90], in the absence of a root CA, Alice may need to have her 
certificate signed by several CAs in order to increase its level of trust. Alice will probably distribute her is 
certificate to all his potential partners and may want to make it available to a larger community by publishing 
it in her www home page or in a public key server. Since, as described in section §2, certificate manipula-
tions do not require real-time intervention of CAs, cached copies of this certificate will be hold by a large 
community of users. 
The analysis of this situation shows that two different logical networks may be distinguished as 
shown in Fig. 3-2.
• the certification network containing the Certification Authorities that are responsible for issuing and 
managing certificates as well as publishing and updating Certificate Revocation Lists(2). The pos-
sible trust links between Certification Authorities (whether they are hierarchical, peer-to-peer, etc.) 
should also be considered as being parts of this network.
• The network where users are sitting and where transactions actually take place that we name the 
core network. The cached copies of certificates mentioned that users hold for establishing secure 
transactions are also constituent parts of this logical network. Caches are instances of the certifica-
tion network used in the core network.
5.1.1 Synchronization Issues
The lack of synchronization between the core network (transaction space) and the certification network (cer-
tification space) is mainly due the off-line nature of certification protocols (see section §1.3.4). When on-
1 Some large companies run their own Certification Authorities and manage certificates for their employees
2 Although is often claimed [26] that certification and revocation should be handled independently and be ac-
complished by different entities, we consider that both of them belong to the certification network for the sake 
of simplicity.- 59 -
Part III   Domain Collaborations in Secure Transactionsline and in-line protocols are involved, there are no synchronization problems since each secure operation 
in the transaction space goes through the certification network before it takes place (one-time certificates, 
tickets a la Kerberos, etc.)
The fact of separating the certification authority from the network operation presents unequivocal benefits 
in terms of security. However, the most significant drawback resides in the need to keep sensitive informa-
tion between both networks perfectly synchronized. More precisely, the following issues should be taken 
into account: 
• Users sit in the core network but the certificates, representing the base of their security, are depend-
ant of the certification network. Any modification affecting the core network - such as identity 
change (i.e. e-mail address) or a private key being compromised or stolen - should be rapidly re-
flected in the certification network and then propagated into the certificate caches located in the core 
network. Caches are snapshots of the certification network used in the core network. This process 
is seriously delayed by the fact that users should physically identify themselves to CAs in order to 
invoke changes in their certificates.
• Inversely, any change in the certificate network - such as certificate revocation due to public key 
expiration or tampering - must be propagated accordingly within the core network. For certificates 
depending on more than one CA, this modifications should also be spread to other entities in the 
certification network. Theoretically, this issue is handled by the publication of Certificate Revoca-
tion Lists that should be periodically examined by users manipulating certificates. Practically, it is 
widely admitted that secure services in the Internet are being provided in the absence of a global 
revocation policy [28].
These points constitute a very serious drawback and even a significant security risk that may potentially be 
exploited by malware and malicious entities in general. The extension of basic security services to larger 
populations will certainly deteriorate this, already precarious, situation. We believe that the information 
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5  Structuring and Protocol Issuesconsistency problem caused by this network separation may be justified in case of strong security needs and 
for specific users and applications rather than for a large deployment of security services. 
5.1.2 Authenticity and Freshness
We introduce here two notions that will contribute to clarify the relations between principals in the core net-
work and the certification space, namely, authenticity and freshness inspired from the BAN logic [15], a 
seminal initiative to theoretically validate authentication protocols:
• When cryptographic material is exchanged by both principals preserving its authenticity and integ-
rity we say that it is Authentic.
• When both ends are informed in an authenticated and confirmed way on any potential modification/
compromise in the cryptographic material, we say that it is Fresh. The notion of freshness is ex-
tremely important in the world of authentication protocols since it distinguishes a key that has been 
negotiated for the means of a present exchange from one that has been used in a previous instance 
of the protocol which might be authentic but is being illicitly replayed.
5.1.3 Synchronous and Asynchronous Revocation
In most of today PKIs, the certification policy is based on long lived certificates that are revoked in a regular 
basis. Both PGP and X.509 based standards recommend the use of periodically updated Certificate Revoca-
tion Lists (CRLs) that allow to keep track of revoked certificates. The usual distribution method for CRLs 
is known as insecure pull what means that principals retrieve CRLs directly from the CA or from a public 
directory though an insecure transaction. Data origin authentication and integrity are obtained through the 
CA signature on the CRL even though the acquisition process is insecure. 
The main problem of this distribution method is that it only provides support for synchronous revo-
cation. This means that actual revocation of certificates becomes effective only at regular time intervals 
ruled by the revocation policy(1). field. As a result, if the time granularity policy of CRL publication is too 
coarse, the time window opened to potential attacks may become unacceptably large. Furthermore, if a user 
is unable to get the last scheduled CRL, he may deduce that the CA didn’t issue the last CRL in due time 
while, in fact, he might be victim of an active attacker who is purposedly dropping or substituting the cor-
responding CRLs. 
This example shows the dangers of synchronous revocation and illustrates why asynchronous revo-
cation is impossible in this a model: simply because the acquisition process of a CRL is basically insecure 
and, as a result, an active attacker might be able to intercept and obliterate an asynchronous notification. 
Supporting asynchronous revocation would require the ability to establish an authenticated and confirmed
transaction (a secure push rather than an insecure pull) between the CA and every principal that may poten-
tially wish to validate a certificate issued by the CA.
If one may argue that the risk exposure inherent to synchronous revocation could be acceptable for 
low risk transactions, there are a number of situations requiring immediate reaction. A stolen private key 
serving as a token for entity authentication or for encrypting sensible information is a clear example where 
a fast response is needed.
1 If the CRL are issued periodically and the period is publicly known, principals may infer wether the re-
trieved CRL is the most recent. Otherwise, the optional field nextupdate may be used for this purpose.- 61 -
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from the combination of both the synchronous revocation and the insecure pull paradigm. In particular, we 
introduce λ metric as a means to quantify the degree of synchronization that can be expected between the 
core and the certification network under these principles.
5.1.4 The Latency Metric
We define the latency time λ for a certification chain, as the time elapsed between the actual revo-
cation of a certificate in the chain and the moment when this revocation is effectively made available to other 
parties by the corresponding CA (e.g. by publishing an updated CRL). In a synchronous, single CA envi-
ronment, it is straightforward to observe that the latency time is bounded by the period of CRL publication. 
Figure Fig. 3-3 illustrates the case where several CAs intervene in a certification path.
Let’s consider (CA1{CA2}, CA2{CA3}, CA3{X})(1) a certification chain for a principal X; if δ1, δ2, and δ3 
(see Figure 3-3) are respectively the CRL publication periods for CA1, CA2, CA3, the worst case in terms 
of latency time would occur if CA2{CA3} is revoked immediately after CA2 publishes its CRL. The latency 
time λ for this certification chain would be close to the period δ2. 
It can be easily deduced from this example that if CA1, CA2,..., CAn having respectively δ1, δ2,..., δn CRL issue periods are involved in a certification path, the latency time λ of the resulting certification 
chain satisfies the inequality:
λ ≤ δmax = max (δ1, δ2,..., δn) (1)
1 The notation A{B} means that A signs a cross certificate to validate B public key certificate. The chain (A 
{B}, B{C}) means that A signs the B public key certificate and that B signs C public key certificate. If our 
trust model supports transitivity, this would mean that there is a certificate chain from A to C.
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5  Structuring and Protocol IssuesThe main interest of the λ metric is that it constitutes a theoretical confidence limit that is inherent 
to the synchronous revocation principle.
5.1.5 Non Recent CRLs
The δi figures in the inequality (1) are based on the time when revocation information is published by the 
involved CAs. However, due to the insecure pull principle which rules the acquisition process of revocation 
information, there is no guarantee that verifiers can actually obtain the most recent CRL. This issue is ag-
gravated by the fact that CRLs can be retrieved from different locations (public directories) where little or 
no control is exercised over the freshness of CRLs.
Assuming that ki is the number of more recent CRL updates that have been ignored by the verifier 
for a given Certification Authority CAi, the λ measure would give:
λ ≤ δmax = max (k1δ1, k2δ2,..., knδn)
which, depending on the quantities involved, may result in an unacceptable upper bound for the la-
tency time and, thus, in a loose synchronization between a certificate cache and the actual certification state.
These figures apply to off-line certification systems based on synchronous revocation such as most 
of today PGP and X.509 environments. On-line certificate validation and reconfirmation schemes such as 
those proposed in [98] and [100] are theoretically free of latency times by design. The on-line paradigm is 
easily deployable in well-confined network environments having either a centralized Certification Authority 
or several CAs independent from each other. However, this approach presents serious limitations when 
scaled to widely distributed environments where several certification entities need to collaborate to build 
certification chains. In order to remain compliant with the on-line principle, verifiers would need to go 
through a connection with each and every entity present in a certification path. From a practical point of 
view, this results in obvious inconveniences such as permanent (24/7) availability required for every certi-
fication entity and significant performance overhead in the validation process (even considering efficient 
schemes as those presented in [81] and [86]). 
5.1.6 Revocation of the CA Main Key
A scenario deserving special attention is revocation of a Certification Authority main signing key. Failing 
to properly and timely distribute revocation information in this case may result in serious security breaches 
affecting large populations of users, especially when revocation is the consequence of private key compro-
mise. The initial PGP and X.509 frameworks did not provide the adequate means to differentiate revocation 
of a CA main signing key from revocation of a user certificate. The X.509 CRL v2 extensions [57] and, in 
particular, the concept of CRL distribution points contributed to create distinctive classes of CRLs according 
to different criteria, such as certificate subject, update policy, revocation reason, etc. This way, CA main 
keys revocations can be published in dedicated distribution points having a small number of entries and a 
very high refreshing rate in order to minimize latency times. 
Although this mechanism provides significant flexibility to the way CA main key revocation is han-
dled, several issues remain:
• No broadcasting mechanism of a self revoking certificate is provided.
• Certification authorities should regulate who deals with the revocation of its main key and more im-
portantly, how the revocation notification is distributed, to whom, with which frequency, and how 
is it authenticated, eventually cross- signed.- 63 -
Part III   Domain Collaborations in Secure Transactions• The role of peer CAs in a flat relationship (or parent-node in a hierarchical structure) is imperative 
in signing key revocation since the CA subject to revocation might have had its key compromised.
To summarize, revocation is important, and the way is dealt with matters. Cross certification is not 
enough. Establishing cooperation basis. In a hierarchical certification structure CAs located in the upper 
nodes will need to include
To summarize, a dedicated framework for CA signing key revocation needs to be properly defined. Hierar-
chical frameworks may deal better with this issue since a higher level entity may reflect revocation of lower 
nodes but in graph like environments, this becomes more complicated:
5.1.7 Delegating Certificate Verification
One of the most significant problems involving the use of PKI resides in the difficulty to verify chains of 
certificates. The hierarchical architecture introduced by X.509 was impractical and will probably never be 
realized. As a consequence the certification network will be developed anarchically, resulting in long certi-
fication paths which will complicate even more the process of verification. PKI systems pay little attention 
to the process of certificate verification. In any case, the entire burden of certificate verification falls on us-
er’s shoulders as described in [28]. This fact may have very negative impact in the overall system security 
especially when deploying security services at a very large scale (and thus to users lacking education on se-
curity). 
The solution here is to delegate certificate verification to a (set of) trusted entities. The certificate 
verification process would be accomplished by a Certification Authority having a authentic and fresh trust 
links with the principal willing to verify the certificate. One will “choose” his verifying certification author-
ity according to potential relations that the CA might have with other certification authorities.
The Routing Example Revisited
The routing network is responsible for finding the best route through the physical network. If we analyze 
the routing example, we find that most of the features inherent to the routing network also apply to the cer-
tification network, namely: 
• Inter-connected and redundant.
• Weighted (depending on the valuation of the trust links).
• Bad news spread fast (CRLs should be distributed very fast).
• Very bad news spread very fast! (CA key compromised).
• Hierarchical structure allowing for cross paths.
In the routing network users are not supposed to find the actual route to the destination machine. They use 
a default gateway for this means. In order for the user to find “the right route” in the certification network, 
he should:
• Be aware of the topology internals and changes of the certification network.
• Navigating in the certification network involves many multiple and complex capabilities (entity au-
thentication, key verification, freshness of several certificates present in the path, etc.).
As a consequence, we consider that certificate validation should not be on the hands of the end users but 
rather delegated to the certification authority. Based on the collaboration framework proposed which in this 
work, this entity is more appropriate to achieve this task.- 64 -
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The structure presented here has a significant effect in the way key acquisition protocols are accomplished. 
In this direction, two important issues must be underlined:
• Certificate acquisition is cumbersome. There is no “responsible CA” for a given user. (Parallel 
with routing domain or MX record). Furthermore, there is no existing Internet infrastructure allow-
ing to associate certification authorities and users. Users should distribute their certificates in a non-
standardized way (peer-to-peer, specialized servers, etc.). Need for a standard way for distribution.
• Certificate verification is difficult. Users, may have their certificates signed by several certifica-
tion authorities and this complicates the verification process (practically, certificates are not veri-
fied).
• Users exchange their certificates and keep caches of them. This essentially promotes the use of 
“off-line” key establishment protocols. This facilitates access to certificates and thus may be con-
sidered as an advantage, but leads to management problems as described in section §5.1.1.
5.2 Structural Recommendations
Relying on the reasons given above, we propose here a recommendation to limit the gap between the certi-
fication structure and the core network and present the main advantages of this approach.
The adequacy of public key cryptography as a support for the provision of security services to large popu-
lations of users has often been questioned. In [28] D. Davis argues on the existence of compliance defects(1)
of public key cryptography. Some of the deficiencies discussed on his paper - such as private key manage-
ment(2) and passphrase quality - are manifestly inherent to public key technology. Others issues - such as 
initial user authentication, CA authentication and certificate revocation - are actually due to the embodying 
certificate infrastructure analyzed in the previous section. This section aims at proposing solutions to the 
above mentioned problems by bringing the certification network closer to the user.
In order to facilitate the large scale deployment of security services, we propose to simplify the net-
work duality analyzed in the previous section by bringing certification services into the core network. In oth-
er words, we suggest to consider certification as a complement to other classical Internet services such as 
address attribution or name resolution. Deployment and management of user certificates will be handled by 
Certification Authorities running in administrative domains (see Part II for the definition of administrative 
domains). 
In fact, this approach exists already for most of the symmetric cryptography solutions. In this case, 
all the security related services are ruled by administrative domains (like in Kerberos, see section §2.1.3). 
Actually, in those systems relying on Key Distribution Centers, the most important issue of the security pol-
icy is to keep information on the KDC secret. This includes physically securing the server(s) and crypto-
graphically protecting (under a KDC master key) the server contents. Since these tasks can hardly be dele-
gated to external organizations, they are usually undertaken by security officers of the administrative do-
main. With the emergence of public key crypto systems, the need for preserving secrecy has been removed 
and only the authenticity of the binding between the user global identification and his public key needs to 
1 Davis defines a compliance defect in a cryptosystem as a rule of operation that is both difficult to follow and 
unenforceable
2 Private-key management issues according to Davis, basically reside in the fact that private-keys are usually 
kept in memory throughout a login session in order to prevent the user from reentering his passphrase fre-
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compromising security but, as we have seen in the previous section, this cause serious practical problems 
that were mastered in symmetric cryptosystems. The structural shift contemplated here aims at benefiting 
from the obvious management advantages of symmetric cryptosystems but still, taking advantage of the 
flexibility of public key cryptosystems.
The envisaged structure does not preclude the existence of external certification entities since they 
may play an important role for specific applications having strong security needs. However, we believe that 
certification entities will be highly dependent of the application (banking, electronic commerce, etc.) they 
are supposed to support and will have according security policies including clearly defined management and 
revocation rules. 
Furthermore, companies providing these services will probably prefer to run their own certification 
networks resulting in a number of unconnected, “ad-hoc” certification services where users may have to use 
different certificates according to the service they demand. 
5.2.1 Administrative/Management Benefits
This structural modification results in significant administrative advantages:
• The process of key pair generation is eased. Centralized and secure procedures may be set up to 
assist users in the creation of public/private keys pairs. Strategies to assist users in the generation of 
“intelligent” passwords for protecting their private keys become easier to deploy.
• The initial authentication step is facilitated: as pointed out in the previous section, the establishment 
of a certificate requires a “physical” authentication and a proof or possession of the private key. The 
practical problems introduced by the need of physical authentication are largely simplified since 
they may be accomplished locally and in parallel with the assignment of system access parameters.
• Facilitate the binding between electronic identity and public key. “External” CAs are not aware of 
the electronic identification since the identity verification process is normally based on the posses-
sion of an id-card or a driving licence. The association between user and e-mail address is made at 
the service provider level.
• Policies concerning key usage and revocation, validity period, certificate modification, etc. - that 
often require the intervention of secure, physical channels - can be more efficiently deployed thanks 
to the proximity to end-users.
• Bringing the certification services closer to the administrative domains facilitates the design and 
deployment of more flexible security policies. This fact has important repercussions in the way keys 
are assigned amongst a community of users and in particular:
• Promotes the deployment of role-based security policies. Role-based security policies for 
specific security services, such as authentication, access control and electronic signature be-
come easier to implement. For an overview of role-based security policies, see [41]. A more 
detailed coverage of the subject can be found in [130] and [106].
• Facilitates the partition in sub-domains. User populations may be partitioned in sub-domains 
as pointed out in [112] according to their security needs and to the nature of interactions tak-
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The segregation of a security infrastructure in a set of well-defined domains brings forward the possibility 
of deploy security services based on domain-based cryptographic parameters as a complement to the tradi-
tional user-based secure transactions.
When two users wish to establish a secure transaction (authenticated, confidential, etc.) they need 
to negotiate the cryptographic parameters involved in the exchange. Typically, if public keys are involved, 
they must obtain and properly validate the corresponding certificates by verifying the signatures of the Cer-
tification Authorities. This approach that is perfectly suited for contained environments like the one de-
scribed has serious deployability and scalability problems when related to large user populations.
Furthermore, a number of security policies are not designed to be applied at the end-user level. For 
instance, a multi-level data classification policy (top-secret, secret, classified, confidential, etc.) needs to be 
established at a domain (organizational) level. As such, domain-based key granularity seems more appro-
priate to establish the corresponding access rights even if finer granularity schemes (user or role based) may 
be as a complement for authentication means.
The underlying idea behind domain-based key granularity is that names and identifiers (distin-
guished names, e-mail addresses, etc.) should be global but not cryptographic parameters that cause signif-
icant and management issues when deployed at a global level. 
Other notable advantages of coarse-grained cryptographic systems include:
• Facilitated ad-hoc deployment. Protecting information where is needed (i.e. between secured do-
mains interconnected by public networks) without dealing with the management complexity of end-
to-end security.
• Contained key management policies. Key management policies may be designed and implemented 
more efficiently and securely in a coarse-grained environment especially when dealing with com-
plex issues such as validation and revocation.
Concerning the precautions to be considered when deploying cryptographic systems with coarse-grained 
keys, the following can be identified:
• Larger amount of ciphertexts for cryptanalisis although most of today’s cryptographic algorithms 
are secure against large volumes of known/chosen plaintext attacks.
• Overhead resulting from successive encryption/decryption operations as described in the end-to-
end secure store and forward example in this thesis (see section §7.2.1). For connection oriented 
applications, only the channel establishment (once for always) is affected. 
• Single point of security failure: compromise of the domain key has very serious security implica-
tions and this eventuality should be closely evaluated. Several solutions exist for these key families 
such as n of m secret sharing schemes and so called, Hardware Security Modules for storing the 
keys in a tamper-proof cryptographically secure device. The interested reader may refer to [131] for 
a precise description o this technical solutions.- 67 -
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One of the most important issues within a PKI resides in the verification of certificates involving several 
(possibly competing) Certification Authorities. This section proposes a new collaboration paradigm be-
tween Certification Authorities that goes beyond hierarchical relationships and cross certification.
6.1 The Need for Multiple Certification Authorities
When dealing with public key cryptosystems, the correct design of the certification infrastructure constitutes 
an essential issue for the success of the whole system. When talking about intra domain security (security 
within a single Domain of Authority), an intuitive approach is to designate a centralized Certification Au-
thority handling every task related to certificate management. However, several factors advocate for the dis-
tribution of this functionality into different CAs:
• Scalability: The amount of work inherent to certification tasks may become very significant as the 
population of certificate holders grows. This might cause problems both in terms of computing and 
human resources.
• Security: Distributing the CA functionality provides a better means to distribute security risks 
• Geo-political reasons: For obvious reasons, a domain of authority should not span multiple coun-
tries.
A Public Key Infrastructure providing support for cryptographic exchanges to a global Internet work needs 
to be composed of multiple certification authorities having different domains of authority (DoA). Apart 
from transactions established within the same DoA, most of the principal secure transactions will involve 
certificates signed by a remote Certification Authority. In order to verify such a certificate, a principal needs 
to hold an authentic and fresh copy of the Certification Authority public key. A so called certification path 
starting at his own CA (for which, he is supposed to have an authentic and fresh copy of its public key) and 
ending at the remote CA needs to be established so that the certificate may be properly validated. 
6.2 Collaborative Certification Authorities
The aim of introducing a collaborative certification framework is mainly to provide a flexible means to re-
duce latency times by introducing a secure framework for synchronous and asynchronous revocation, allow-
ing to synchronize both the core and certification networks and to better react to critical situations such as 
CA main failures or key revoke. Our framework also provides room for introducing trust values like in the 
Maurer work [77].
6.2.1 Collaboration Types
The main idea behind the collaborative CA principal is to promote the exchanges between Certifi-
cation Authorities by establishing collaboration contracts. The expected outcome of such an enhanced col-
laboration framework is to provide principals with collaboration packets containing timeful proofs of state
that reflect accurately the actual status of the certification network. The fact that several CAs are involved 
in the process allows to increase the level of trust. Collaboration contracts can be modeled in a flexible man-
ner according to operational factors, trust relationships between CAs and the level of freshness/accuracy re-
quired by principals.- 68 -
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them are unilateral (from source to destination CA) and, as in cross certification, a mutual trust relationship 
will result in two unilateral contracts. Basically, two modes of collaboration can be distinguished:
• Synchronous Collaboration: Information is exchanged at regular time intervals.
• Asynchronous Collaboration: Information is exchanged at regular time intervals but the source CA 
may preemptively send an asynchronous notification to the destination CA under well-defined cir-
cumstances.
6.2.2 Protecting Collaboration Exchanges
Collaboration exchanges are requested to be authenticated (including both data origin authentication and 
integrity) and confirmed but not necessarily confidential as they carry public information. This means that 
the identity of the source CA should be properly validated by the destination CA and that the source CA is 
required to verify that the destination CA received the message.
A first issue inherent to the establishment of such a secured collaboration channel is determining 
the keying material used to protect collaboration exchanges. Using source and destination CA main keys for 
this purpose is inappropriate because these keys may be subject to expiration or revocation events within the 
same collaboration packet. As a result, collaborations exchanges are protected by specific keying material
which is exclusive to the collaboration. These, so called, collaboration keys are inherent to a collaboration 
contract in such a way that different collaboration contracts will result in distinct keying material for each 
collaboration. 
Both symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms (or a combination of both) are eligible 
for protecting collaboration exchanges. The limitations of symmetric techniques for exchanging secrets 
amongst a set of unconnected entities are not relevant here since only source and destination CA are con-
cerned and exchanging secret keys through a secure channel might be considered as an a priori requirement 
for the collaboration contract. However, despite performance overhead, asymmetric algorithms constitute a 
better alternative since they offer direct support for non repudiation in case of disputes. In this paper, we use 
public key technology for the collaboration exchanges examples.
Obviously, a coherent security policy is needed to rule key management issues (such as key revo-
cation, key update, etc.) for the collaboration keying material. Typical key management problems inherent 
to widely distributed environments are highly simplified from the fact that only two entities are involved in 
the collaboration. Furthermore, these keys aim only at protecting collaboration exchanges between collab-
orating CAs and have no visibility outside the collaboration. In particular, they are completely transparent 
to principals involved in certificate validation and to other Certification Authorities.
Besides cryptographic algorithms, security protocols providing data origin authentication, integrity
and confirmation services are needed to securely achieve the collaboration exchanges between both parties. 
This protocol should provide protection against well known active attacks such as man-in-the-middle, re-
plays, reflection, etc.(1). In the shake of brevity and clarity, we will omit details inherent to the protocol (such 
as challenge and response exchanges) and will assume that the above mentioned security services are pro-
vided.
1 Several protocols can be found in the literature providing the envisaged services and immune to these at-
tacks. The reader may wish to refer to [80] or [110] in order to find a comprehensive description of such pro-
tocols.- 69 -
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level of clock synchronization between CAs is also assumed.
6.2.3 Classification of Collaboration Contents
We distinguish three main categories of information to be exchanged between CAs:
• User certificate information: Every important event regarding user certificates under the CA juris-
diction should be included in the collaboration exchange such the last updated CRL (or delta-CRL), 
issuing time of the next delta CRL (if not present in the current CRL), etc.
• CA main key related information such as the current main key and its validity time, the next sched-
uled key update, the last main key revocation (if any), etc.
• Operational issues affecting the CA behaviour such as changes in the certification or revocation 
structure (CDP, indirect CRLs, etc.), failures, expected downtimes, etc. 
It should be noted that in most cases, the information itself doesn’t need to be included in the collaboration 
packet but rather an identifier that allows principals to properly validate its origin and freshness. For exam-
ple, the current CA main signing key together with a the last CRL identifier retrieved through a secure chan-
nel is enough for verifying a certificate provided that the corresponding CRL can be obtained through other 
(even insecure) means.
6.2.4 Generic Format of a Collaboration Packet
Let’s assume that CAA establishes a collaboration contract with CAB. Exchanges occurring within this col-
laboration are prefixed by the sequence "A → B" whereas a packet signed with the key k is noted: {}k. The 
so called collaboration certificate constitutes the fundamental element of the collaboration and has the fol-
lowing generic form:
Note that two different private keys are involved in the signatures of this exchange: the CAA’ collaboration 
key that signs the Coll_cert certificate and the CAA’ main key (i.e. the one signing regular certificates) that 
signs the state and forward certificates. The former will be exclusively visible within the collaboration be-
tween A and B whereas the latter may need to be validated by other principals or Certification Authorities 
involved in the certification path or in the forwarding chain. Each collaboration certificate contains the fol-
lowing fields:
• Cert_Info comprises the collaboration certificate version and serial number together with a ref-
erence to the collaboration contract to which this certificate belongs. 
• Coll_cert ::= { Cert_Info Signing_Info Abs_Time State_Cert List 
*Fwd_Cert}CAsource Coll_key
• Common_info ::= { Cert_Info Signing_Info Abs_Time Fwd_Info Packet_Type 
Coll_Entities Coll_Period Coll_Trust Sequence_Number }
• State_cert ::= { Common_info Logging_Start_Time State_Descr }CAsource 
Main_key
• Fwd_cert ::= { Common_info [State_cert | Fwd_cert] }CAsource Coll_key- 70 -
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mation, public key value, algorithm identifier, etc.).
• The Abs_Time field contains the signing time of the collaboration certificate.
• The State_Cert describes the current state of the source CA. A detailed description of this field 
is provided below.
• Finally, a list of forwarded certificates (Fwd_Cert) containing the relevant certificates that the 
source Certification Authority has agreed to distribute on behalf of another CA. Basically, a forward 
certificate is composed by a state certificate issued by an original CA together with collaboration 
information signed by every CAs involved in the forwarding chain. The section below provides a 
complete description of the forwarding certificates.
The State Certificate
The so called state certificate (State_Cert) holds the relevant information concerning the actual status of 
the source CA. State_cert is composed by the following records:
• The Cert_Info, Signing_Info and Abs_Time records are basically equivalent to those in 
Coll_Cert except that they apply to the state certificate.
• The Fwd_Info field holds the forwarding information that indicates whether the destination CA 
may forward the State_Cert to other Certification Authorities(1). Although the kind of data carried 
by the State_Cert is basically public, spreading sensible information (such as revocation of a main 
key) on a wide basis may have serious consequences that the source CA may wish to prevent or lim-
it. An extra field indicating a list of CA names to which State_Cert may (or may not) be forwarded 
can be associated to this flag.
• Packet_type indicates whether the state certificate belongs to a synchronous sequence (synchr
flag) or it has been sent asynchronously by CAA (asynchr_flag) as a result of a particular event.
• The Coll_Entities field holds the naming information (such as an X.500 object identifier) for 
the source and destination entities)
• Coll_period specifies the periodicity at which synchronous collaboration packets are exchanged 
between the source and destination CA. This field together with the Time_of_Sign allows to as-
sess whether the destination CA has forwarded the most recent State_Cert to other parties.
• Coll_Trust indicates the level of trust that the source CA has on the destination CA with respect 
to the collaboration behaviour. This trust relies mostly in the ability of the destination CA to timely 
distribute to other CAs the most recent state certificates (especially the asynchronous ones)
• The Sequence_Number allows to keep track of packet’s order and to detect potential misbehav-
iours in the destination CA especially when dealing with asynchronous packets.
• The Logging_Start_Time field indicates starting time of events reported in this certificate
The State_Descr is the most relevant part of the certificate. It is composed by a list of entries classified in 
three major categories:
1 An extra field specifying the unique names of authorized entities to which State_Cert can be forwarded may 
be included here.- 71 -
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val starting at Logging_Start_Time and ending at Time_of_Sign. Examples of such events 
are the issue of a new CRL or delta CRL, the revocation of a main signing key, etc.
• Operational information affecting the behaviour of the source CA that may create dangerous uncer-
tainty periods such as planned unavailability times, modifications in the CRL update periodicity, 
etc.
• Informational data. In order to better reflect its present state, the source CA issues reminders re-
garding essential certification facts that have not been subject to any particular change (and thus, do 
not appear under category a). Examples of these records are confirmation of current main signing 
key(s), identifier of the last issued CRL(s), etc.
Every entry of the three above categories appears together with the time of issue so that an accurate and time-
ly view of the source CA’s actual state is provided to other entities. This list is sorted in descending chrono-
logical order, so that the most recent entry appears first. Here is an example of a State_Descr sequence re-
flecting events related to revocation of a main key followed by generation and confirmation of a new key. 
A pointer to the most recent CRL is also included:
State_Descr : < Last_CRL ID90131 02/13/2007 10:31:13 Main_Key1_Confirm ID89328 
(PUB80josadadsq3) 02/13/2007 10:28:13 GMT, Main_Key1_Gen ID89328 (PUB80josadadsq3) 02/
12/2007 03:00:00, Main_Key1_Revoke ID89327 (PUB8920dujasldsa) 02/12/2007 02:34:58 GMT >
6.2.5 Forwarding Collaboration Packets
The main objective of the proposed collaboration environment is to provide a means to accurately validate 
certificates in a widely distributed Public Key Infrastructure. The forwarding operation constitutes the basic 
mechanism to extend the peer-to-peer collaboration paradigm to larger populations of Certification Author-
ities.
In order to explain the forwarding mechanism, we will concentrate on the exchanges occurring between 
three Certification Authorities, namely CAA, CAB and CAC (see Figure 3-4). We assume that CAA and CAB 
are linked by a collaboration contract and that CAB is entitled to forward a state certificate originated at CAA
to CAC. It should be noted that the behavior of CAB is identical whether it receives a state certificate from 
CAA or a forward certificate (i.e. a certificate containing state information of a certification authority pre-
ceding CAA in the collaboration chain). The state certificate exchanged within a collaboration contract con-
tains the instructions to be observed by CAB in terms of forwarding. The fact that forwarding instructions 
are included in the state certificate rather than being collaboration specific makes it accessible to every entity 
participating in a collaboration chain.
Forwarding Modes
The certification authority generating the state certificate (CAA in our example) may choose amongst three 
basic forwarding modes:
• Not Forwardable: The state certificate must not be forwarded by CAB to any other third party CA.
• Forwadable: CAB is delegated by CAA for the task of forwarding the state certificate to a selected 
set of third party CAs. The generic forwardable condition is particularly well suited to: a) hierarchi-
cal certification topologies as a means to propagate a state certificate from lower to higher levels of 
a certification tree and b) widely distribution of sensible information (such as revocation of main 
keys). 
Obviously, the forwardable condition may result in undesirable flooding problems when used in - 72 -
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spread bad news under critical situations.
• Forwardable within a specified path. The source CA completely determines the path to be followed 
by the state certificate and the CAs involved in this path should proceed accordingly. The example 
appearing in Figure 3-4 shows a forwarding path starting at CAA and ending at CAC which means 
that the latter is not authorized to further forward the state certificate.
Distributing state information in such a certification environment is a rather complex issue involving two 
main areas of investigation: routing algorithms and delegation of rights in widely distributed environments. 
The main intent of the mechanism proposed here is to show how state certificate can be forwarded across a 
set of entities in a controlled way rather than proposing a generic solution to these problems. Readers inter-
ested in efficient Internet routing solutions may refer to [52]. The issue of right delegation in distributed en-
vironments is covered in [46]. 
Forwarding Details
Upon reception of a collaboration packet, CAB verifies the corresponding signatures in both the collabora-
tion and the state certificate and extracts the forwarding information. If a explicit path is specified and CAB
has a collaboration contract with the next CA in this path, then CAB will forward the packet along with its 
own state information in the next collaboration packet. If no path is specified but the state certificate is 
tagged as "forwardable", then CAB will decide to which CAs the state certificate will be forwarded depend-
ing on its own forwarding policy.
The state packet rules the forwarding behavior of the destination CA. Before proceeding to forward-
ing a state packet, the destination CA will perform a set of operations in the state certificate received. In 
particular, it will sign the resulting packet with its main signing key.
7 Collaborative Security Domains
At a global level, setting up security domains for end-to-end transactions enables potential collaborations 
between them that may result in significant enhancements in terms of security management and flexibility. 
More precisely:
CAA CAB CAC
Coll_Cert B->C
State_CertA
Fwd_Path:
(CAA,CAB,CAC)
...
Coll A->B
State_CertA
Fwd_Path:
(CAA,CAB,CAC)
...
Fwd_Cert A->B
State_Certb
Fwd_Path:
(CAB,CAC,...)
...
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security - where secure channels are established under domain keys - becomes a valid alternative to 
classical user-keys protocols. 
• Domains collaborations may also assist in the process of certificate verification where, according 
to the present certification infrastructure, the user plays a major role. A local CA may be delegated 
by the end-user to assess the validity of other CAs according to trust relationships that may exist 
between them (see paragraph below). As a result, the user only needs to check the authenticity of 
the public key of the local CA.
• Other security schemes involving also domain-based key granularity as a complement to existent 
user granularity security schemes.
7.1 Collaborative Domains Trust Model
Consider a generic Internet transaction(1) (such as a WWW query, an E-mail exchange or an rlogin ses-
sion) taking place between two principals - for instance, a user, an application or a host - for which we wish 
to provide security services. For simplicity, we divide the principals into two categories: initiators (the E-
mail sender, the WWW client, or the rlogin user) and responders (the E-mail recipient, the WWW server, 
or the rlogin daemon). Evidently, according to the direction of the dialog, these roles will be alternatively 
held by both principals. The domains of the initiator and the responder are named source and destination 
domains respectively (Fig. 3-5).
A coordinated, global Directory Service (DS) holding naming information and especially certifi-
cates that securely bind domains to their public keys is also required and constitutes the cryptographic sup-
port for inter-domain transactions. As mentioned, existing naming infrastructures (DNS-sec, X.509) might 
be used for this purpose.
A well defined convention establishing an Uniform Naming Information (UNI) is also needed to 
designate principals and domains globally and unequivocally as, for instance, a common name, an E-mail 
address, or a network address. Note that this information may also be published in the Directory Service.
The information necessary for the provision of secure end-to-end transactions is kept in the Local 
Authentication Database (LAD) that will contain for each principal (UNI) the local authentication creden-
tials: for this, we propose to use an asymmetric cryptosystem with the principal owning the private key and 
the LAD holding the corresponding public key(2). 
For each security domain, a Domain Key Holder (DKH) and a Domain Border System (DBS) are 
defined(3). The DKH stores the key-ring of domain public/private key pairs. The DBS is the active player in 
the domain collaboration and has a dual role:
• With respect to inter-domain operations, the DBS provides the required security services (confiden-
tiality, authentication, etc.) between domain borders. For this matter, the DBS needs a secure mech-
anism (encrypted and authenticated) to obtain private keys from the DKH and public keys of peer-
domains from the DS.
1 The term transaction has been preferred to application or service to stress the genericity (levels 4-6 of the 
TCP/IP stack) of the proposed concepts.
2 Intra-domain symmetric solutions can be easily adapted to the presented schemes by replacing the LAD by 
an existing Key Distribution Center (KDC).
3 Replicating both the DBS and the DKH may be an appropriate policy for performance and reliability issues.- 74 -
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as establishing authenticated or encrypted sessions with the transaction principals. As a conse-
quence, the DBS requires an authenticated access to the LAD in order to verify the identity of prin-
cipals inside its domain.
Note that the inter-domain operations rely exclusively on cryptographic keys of peer domains provided by 
a global directory structure whereas intra-domain operations are only ruled by intra domain (locally man-
aged) cryptographic parameters.
The next section illustrates the use of the proposed approach by describing more in depth the mech-
anisms involved in the provision of different security services as well as the level of security obtained in 
each case. Note that only those pieces of information relevant to the encryption process will be mentioned. 
Other transaction-dependent data records - such as routing information or specific header fields - are omitted 
to improve clarity of the proposed schemes.
7.2 Domain-based Security Services
In this section, we show how this architecture might be used to effectively provide classical security services 
(authentication and confidentiality). On one hand Store & Forward applications such as e-mail based on 
non-interactive protocols. On the other hand, interactive key establishment protocols allowing to set up se-
cure channels. The application of this concept to other security services such as anonymity and availability 
is also discussed.
LAD
Initiator
DS
UNI PubK
xyz@S asdfghj
Source
LAD
Responder
Destination
UNI PubK
abc@D zxcvbn
...
...
...
...
Authenticated and encrypted channel
End-to-end secure extension
Authenticated channel
Domain Domain
S-DKH
S-DBS
D-DKH
D-DBS
DS:Directory Service 
UNI:Uniform Naming Information 
LAD:Local Authentication Database 
DKH:Domain Key Holder 
DBS:Domain Border System
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This section explains how basic security services as authentication and confidentiality may be provided to 
store & forward applications such as electronic mail with the domain-based security architecture described 
above.
Confidentiality
Relying on the described architecture, two different types of confidential transactions can be achieved: inter-
domain (information is protected exclusively between domain borders) and end-to-end (confidentiality is 
provided in the whole path between principals).
Inter-domain Confidentiality
The source DBS acts as encryptor for the outgoing transactions, using the public key (obtained from the DS) 
of the destination domain(s)(1). Upon data reception, the destination DBS acting as decryptor decrypts the 
transaction with the private key of its domain (obtained from the DKH). According to the volume of infor-
mation to be transmitted, a DBS may choose to generate a random session key and use it to perform a more 
efficient, symmetric encryption. In this case, the asymmetric encryption using the public key of the destina-
tion domain will exclusively concern a header containing this session key. This header may also contain an 
identifier for the symmetric algorithm used to encrypt the transaction core in order to ensure compatibility 
at both ends. The functionality offered by the DBSs in this scheme is often known as secure gatewaying.
The main advantage of inter-domain confidentiality lies in the fact that services may be provided transpar-
ently to the parties involved in the transaction. This is especially convenient for:
• Organizations having well protected private networks which are mostly concerned by securing bulk 
data exchanges beyond their borders at low management costs.
• Service providers wishing to offer secure transactions as a value added facility independently of the 
software used at both ends.
End-to-end Confidentiality
According to the characteristics of the transaction and the principals involved, we propose the choice of two 
alternatives to achieve end-to-end confidentiality using domain collaborations. The first one, which is a sim-
ple extension of the inter-domain mechanism described above, heavily involves the DBS in the encryption 
and decryption tasks (Fig. 3-6(a)):
1) The initiator generates a session key for encrypting transaction contents and creates a header con-
taining the session key and the UNI of the responder. This header is encrypted with the source do-
main public key and sent to the source DBS together with the transaction core. Additional decryp-
tion information (DI) - such as the decryptor UNI and encryption parameters - is sent in the clear to 
make possible the decryption process.
2) The source DBS decrypts the header using its private key (provided by the DKH), re-encrypts the 
header with the public key of the destination domain and sends it to the destination DBS together 
with the encrypted transaction contents.
3) The destination DBS receives the encrypted packet and extracts the header containing the encrypted 
session key and the responder UNI. The UNI allows to find the local public key of the responder in 
1 In case of a multi-cast transaction, a different encryption will be achieved for each destination domain.- 76 -
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to the responder.
This solution is particularly convenient for principals lacking access to a global DS. It is suitable for domains 
with strong security policies where the source DBS acts as proxy (unique exit point) and the destination DBS 
has firewall functionality (unique entry point). Furthermore, the fact that the identity of the responder is en-
crypted provides an additional level of protection against traffic analysis attacks.
Despite its advantages, this solution introduces significant delay due to the transit of the whole 
transaction between both DBSs. Furthermore, this approach requires up to three public encryptions/decryp-
tions with different keys which may represent an unacceptable overhead to certain applications. The second 
method eliminates these drawbacks by having the principals play a major role (Fig. 3-6(b)): 
1) The initiator generates the same header as in the precedent case (Session Key + responder UNI) and 
then issues a DS query to obtain the destination domain public key for header encryption. Finally, 
the whole packet together with the decryption information is submitted directly to the responder.
2) Upon data reception, the responder submits the header to the destination DBS to obtain the session 
key.
3) The DBS relying on the responder UNI will simply return the session key encrypted with the local 
public key received from the LAD.
Apart from a lower band-width consumption, an important advantage of this method resides in the fact that 
the DBS does not have access to the transaction contents.
W.Ford and M.J. Wiener in [42] propose a similar mechanism restricted to E-mail transactions en-
cryption with the aim of providing more flexible access control and object-based protection.
k = session key / E( ) = encryption
pub-s = source domain public key
pub-d = destination domain public key
pub-r = responder local public key
UNIr = responder Uniform Naming Information
DIs = UNIs + Keyid + Algid
DId = UNId + Keyid + Algid
DIr = UNIr + Keyid + Algid
Figure 3-6(a) Domain-based end-to-end confidentiality, 1st Variant Figure 3-6(b): Domain-based end-to-end confidentiality, 1st Variant
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Two different kinds of authentication are possible: inter-domain where only the originating domain is au-
thenticated and end-to-end where the originating principal is authenticated as being a member of the source 
domain.
Inter-domain Authentication
A DBS acting as authenticator should: (a) generate an integrity code (IC) by applying a one-way function 
(i.e. MD5) to the whole transaction data (or to a significant part of it); (b) sign the IC with the domain private 
key obtained through a secure channel from the DKH. The destination DBS acting as verifier will validate 
the authenticated IC using the public key of the source domain obtained from the DS. If the destination DBS 
has firewall functionality, it may reject transactions coming from unauthenticated domains.
Using an image from the commercial world, this method provides a degree of authentication equiv-
alent to an enterprise stamp that would be issued to validate a document. This kind of authentication is valu-
able for authorizing transactions coming from well-defined domains which might be low-level (a set of 
equipments) or high-level (a set of applications or users). The described mechanism is also convenient for 
integrity and non-repudiation provision on a domain basis.
End-to-End Authentication
For the provision of end-to-end authentication, we also propose two alternatives. The first one, involving 
the source DBS is dual to its confidentiality counterpart (see Fig. 3-7(a)). Note that upon reception of the 
authenticated packet, the destination DBS signs it with its private key. As a consequence, the responder 
needs to trust the destination DBS as a signature relay for all the authenticated packets arriving to the do-
main. Although, this method presents obvious overhead problems, it might be adequate for end systems hav-
ing limited access to the Internet.
A more generic and efficient design where principals play the active role is summarized below (See 
Fig. 3-7(b)):
1) The initiator first generates an IC for the transaction contents. Then, it submits a packet containing 
the IC and its own UNI signed with its local private key to the source DBS. The decryption infor-
mation (DI) sent in the clear allows to identify the key to be used by the source DBS to verify the 
signature.
2) Upon verification of the initiator identity (from the LAD), the source DBS sends the initiator the 
header containing both the IC and the initiator UNI, signed with the source DBS private key. 
3) The initiator submits to the responder both this header and the transaction core. The responder ver-
ifies the identity (the UNI) of the initiator by decrypting the header with the source domain public 
key obtained from the DS.
It should be noted that these transactions must be combined with classical techniques as time-stamps ([30]), 
one-time nonces or mutual handshaking ([88]) in order to prevent replay attacks. 
The level of authentication obtained by this process depends obviously on how far the source domain can 
be trusted. Compared to a classical commercial transaction, the degree of authentication obtained is equiv-
alent to an employee signature authenticated by an employer stamp.
• The importance of “role-based” authentication and how it can be better achieved through domain-
based architecture.- 78 -
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Those applications needing to exchange large amounts of data such as real time communications (Internet 
phone, video-conference, etc.) and connection oriented applications (such as http transactions or ftp trans-
fers) may require the establishment “a priori” of a secure channel by mutually exchanging or generating se-
cret keys. These keys may be used as authentication and secrecy means for subsequent exchanges taking 
place between parties. There exist dozens of key agreement protocols based on both symmetric and asym-
metric techniques, providing different flavors of authentication and confidentiality (many of these protocols 
are described in [125] and [80]). We have selected the Station-to-Station protocol to introduce its domain-
based version. This protocol in one of the most widely used and resilient and it displays interesting charac-
teristics such as Perfect Forward Secrecy and key confirmation.
The Station-to-Station (STS) protocol, introduced in [33] extends the classical Diffie-Helman key 
exchange [32] with signed exponentials in order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. This protocol allows 
two parties to share an authenticated secret key which can be used to establish a secure channel for subse-
quent exchanges. Furthermore, the protocol provides mutual entity authentication and anonymity with re-
spect to eavedroppers since the identity of parties is always transmitted encrypted. Finally the STS protocol 
delivers Perfect Forward Secrecy. For the sake of completeness, the classical, user-based granularity is pre-
sented in this section before its domain-based counterpart.
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One time setup:
1) Publish a prime p and a generator a of Zp*, 2 < α <= p - 2.
2) Each user (A and B) selects RSA public and private signatures keys (e, n) and d respectively. Parties 
are supposed to have authentic copies of the other’s pubic keys.
The protocol (k being the Diffie-Helman key : α^xy mod p)
1) A -> B : α^x mod p
2) A <- B : α^y mod p, Ek (Sb (α^y, α^x))
3) A -> B : Ek (Sa(α^x,α^y))
Domain-based Granularity Version (with Short-live Certificates(1))
The domain-based granularity version provided mutual, domain-based, end-to-end authentication.
Three step process
1) Both parties (x = (a | b)) generate a key pair. This process precedes any information exchange and 
the generated key pair may be reused for several exchanges, depending to the security policy; once 
for several sessions.
2) Startup: Once for each session
a) Publish a prime p and a generator α of Zp*, 2 < α <= p - 2.
b) Ask the DBS to sign the corresponding certificate:
• X -> CAx : UNIx, Pubx, TimeStamp, validity(2), Sx(UNIx, Pubx, timestamp, validity 
(short) / one-time).
• X <- CAx : CCA-x := SCA-x(UNIx, Pubx, timestamp, validity (short) / one-time)
The UNIx field contains the Uniform Naming Information designating entity x. Pubx and 
Privx represent the asymmetric key-pair generated by x. The timestamp contains an uniform 
(and absolute) timing information and the validity field indicates a lapse of time where the 
certificate can be used. According to the application and the user needs, this period range 
from several seconds to several minutes.
Another possibility would be to use one-time certificates with nonces
3) The protocol (k being the Diffie-Helman key : α^xy mod p):
a) A -> B : α^x mod p 
b) A <- B : α^y mod p, Ek (SPriv-b(α^y, α^x)) , CCA-b
c) A -> B : Ek (SPriv-a(α^y, α^x)) , CCA-a
1 For both protocols, the selected solution relies on-line short-live certificates. This is to prevent overhead re-
sulting from exchanging exponents between clients and DBSs.
2 The validity time ranges between seconds to one day depending on the application- 80 -
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• With respect to the cryptographic security, this solution is user-based but with respect to the verifi-
cation process it uses the domain-based granularity. When compared to the in-line, crypto relay, this 
approach is safer from a cryptanalysis point of view since the volume of data encrypted under the 
same key is smaller.
• Public/key pairs may be reused. As soon as the key pair is compromised no more certificates will 
be delivered for this key pair. Both the user and the CA may take the initiative of generating new 
keys.
• No revocation is needed at the user level (due to the short-live of user certificates). Revocation at 
the domain level might be needed to some extent (depending on trust collaborations explained 
above).
• Possible attacks:
• Both CAs may collude to perform an active man-in-the-middle attack.
• Due to the nature of STS protocol, a single corrupted CA will not compromise the system se-
curity which represents a great advantage with respect to classical PKC.
7.2.3 Other Applications of Domain-based Frameworks
One of the main advantages of dealing with coarse granularity, domain-based cryptographic parameters is 
that transactions can be authenticated to some extent without having to disclose the end user identity. The 
idea of "anonymous authentication" can be achieved by means of an authentication protocol that relies ex-
clusively on domain-based keys. The main benefit of this technique is that the domain origin is identified 
and this information can be useful to authorize and/or validate incoming transactions.
When dealing with electronic mails systems, a collaboration framework between disjoint domains 
can be established in order to mutually authenticate e-mail messages with domain-based public keys while 
leaving end-user authentication as an option. If end user anonymity is required, the domain-based key may 
be used to sign an anonymous tag and "blind" user identity in the message header. This "tagging" can be 
performed in a way which is completely transparent to the end user. An interesting work addressing this 
form of mail ubiquity can be found in [34].
Another application of the domain collaboration framework is to increase traffic control at network 
level. A network of trust can be established between a number of participating domains so that only packets 
tagged with the collaborating domain key are authorized to penetrate domain borders. This solution can be 
applied, for example, when the domain is being victim of a denial of service attack in order preserve traffic 
of legitimate sources.
8 Further Extensions
As stated in Part II of this work devoted to Management, we firmly believe that this research direction opens 
a number of promising possibilities that can be explored in further detail. We enumerate below the more 
relevant ones:
• Domain-based key granularity can be applied to multiple aspects of secure transactions. The store 
and forward example addressed by this work is an example that can be extended to other protocol 
families. One interesting application would consist in applying this approach to better control traffic - 81 -
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to deploy to protect their assets from Internet threats. A domain-based tag would help to segregate 
traffic originated at security sensitive areas (as the DeMilitarized Zones (DMZs)) and would con-
tribute to detect potential intrusions.
• There are a number of aspects related to Certification Authorities collaboration that would be inter-
esting to address. For instance develop a prototype featuring a tight collaboration environment be-
tween two CAs related to certificate management. Such a prototype would serve to deeply analyse 
the synchronization issues described in this thesis and to evaluate the benefits of the architecture in 
terms of security and service availability.
• The recent developments in identity management and in particular the solutions based on, so called, 
Privilege Management Infrastructures (PMI) can highly benefit from the domain structure present-
ed in this work. In particular, environments implementing role based access control which are di-
rectly dependant of the domain authority.- 82 -
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During the last years and in parallel with the realization of this Ph.D. thesis, the computer industry has un-
dergone a number of very important transformations. The field of information security, one of the main axes 
of this work, has played a fundamental role in these transformations and has become a main focus of atten-
tion due to its continuous presence in the media and the public opinion in general.
The number and the significance of the attacks affecting information systems and public networks 
as the Internet has increased dramatically. The profile of the attackers has also fundamentally changed, from 
eventual hackers seeking personal satisfaction or public recognition to organized cyber-terrorists targeting 
espionage activities or substantial economic rewards. The figures are terrifying: 55 millions of potential vic-
tims of identity theft in 2007 only in the USA, security breaches that unveil millions of credit card numbers 
to cyber-thieves, phising attacks seamlessly stealing e-banking customer’s credentials and, finally, the fact 
that cyber-crime has become more lucrative (and less risky) than drug or weapons traffic for criminal orga-
nizations.
In the meantime from a purely technical perspective, cryptographic algorithms have become stron-
ger and subject to extensive and public expert analysis (AES), security protocols have got over childhood 
defects and information security has become a mature discipline gathering thousands of talented proffes-
sionals.
So the question that come to the surface is: what went wrong ? If we analyze the inner workings of 
all the attacks above mentioned, there is one striking fact that stands out: none of them requires breaking a 
cryptographic algorithm. Amongst many other causes, we distinguish: faulty programming techniques, in-
adequate system and network control and the lack of a resilient certification structure providing for mass 
distribution of security services such as strong authentication and confidentiality.
When I look back to my very first steps in the security arena, I remember that I was struck by the 
inconsistencies of the X.509 certification infrastructure that had just surfaced. At that time I was convinced 
that this standard would never see the light as a widely deployed solution. Time has proved me right. Since 
that moment, my most significant research interests were aimed at enhancing the deployability of security 
services and improving the management of widely distributed systems. These two topics constitute the main 
axes of this Ph.D. thesis.
Finally, I would like to stress the fact that together with the purely academic research activities, this 
Ph.D.Thesis is the outcome of an extensive experience as a practitioner developed both in the academic and 
private sectors. As a result, I sincerely hope that the concepts and practical solutions put forward in this work 
will throw some light into these very complex but fascinating subjects.- 83 -
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Part V Résumé en Français
Domaines Collaborateurs dans L’Environnement Internet 
Alors que l’invention de l’ordinateur personnel dans les années 80 a permis un accès globalisé au 
monde digital, l’apparition ultérieure du World Wide Web s’est traduite par un usage généralisé 
des applications largement distribuées dans un cadre global. La plupart des transactions digitales 
qui constituent les bases des réseaux à large échelle comme l’Internet, sont basées sur un principe 
de granularité fine dans lequel les utilisateurs finaux et les applications interagissent suivant un 
modèle de communication prédéfini (bout-en-bout, client-serveur, etc.). Par exemple, un utilisa-
teur d’Internet qui souhaite réaliser un achat dans un magasin en ligne, lance une application client 
qui interagit directement avec l’application serveur correspondante du coté vendeur. Alors que ce 
modèle de granularité fine est approprié pour la réalisation de nombreuses transactions Internet, il 
présente certains problèmes lorsqu’il s’agit de gérer ces applications ou d’y rajouter des services 
de sécurité. Dans le premier cas, il peut être nécessaire d’obtenir une vue concise d’un service plu-
tôt que d’analyser l’état détaillé de la transaction. Dans d’autres cas, il peut être souhaitable de dé-
léguer des taches sensibles en termes de sécurité, comme la création ou le stockage sécurisé des 
clés de cryptage a une entité dédiée partagée par tous les composants du même domaine.
L’idée des domaines collaborateurs présentée dans ce travail, offre une approche structurée 
pour gérer les situations pour lesquelles le choix d’une granularité fine n’est pas approprié. Ce tra-
vail prétend montrer comment la définition et, plus particulièrement, la collaboration de ces domai-
nes se traduit par une plus grande flexibilité et évolutivité dans la gestion et la sécurité des appli-
cations distribuées.
Ce travail se divise en deux grandes parties. La première analyse l’impact des domaines 
collaborateurs dans la gestion de réseaux et des applications distribuées. Elle décrit une nouvelle 
architecture de gestion ainsi qu’un ensemble de scénarios implémentés pour illustrer ce concept. 
La deuxième grande partie de ce travail se concentre sur les avantages de la séparation et la colla-
boration des domaines dans le déploiement de services de sécurité à des applications largement dis-
tribuées comme celles qui s’exécutent dans le cadre d’Internet. Les protocoles cryptographiques 
qui constituent les blocs de base de ce modèle basé sur les domaines sont également proposés et 
comparés à leurs équivalents peer-to-peer.- 85 -
Part V   Résumé en Français1 Analyse du problème et Définition des Objectifs
La vitesse d’expansion et le degré de pénétration des réseaux a large échelle comme l’Internet a 
ouvert un monde de nouvelles opportunités à une très large communauté d’utilisateurs. Le déve-
loppement de ces réseaux a également provoqué un certain nombre de problèmes en termes d’in-
teropérabilité:
• Faible évolutivité: Le réseau Internet fût conçu pour fédérer un ensemble de sous-réseaux 
militaires et académiques. L’utilisation actuelle d’Internet comme un outil de communica-
tion globale n’était pas prévue par ses concepteurs à l’époque de sa création. L’avènement 
du World Wide Web comme un vecteur fondamental et exponentiel de croissance est large-
ment responsable du succès grandissant d’Internet. Le problème est qu’Internet en tant que 
support de cette nouvelle application n’est pas suffisamment évolutif (surtout en termes de 
gestion et de sécurité) pour s’adapter à cette croissance.
• Soutenabilité de l’infrastructure de base: Le grave problème du manque d’adresses dispo-
nibles est en train de devenir une menace très significative pour la croissance future d’In-
ternet. Selon le forum IPv6, déjà dans 2008 il sera extrêmement complexe de se procurer 
des nouvelles plages d’adresses. Par conséquent, la migration vers IPv6 est devenue une 
certitude imminente ainsi que les grandes difficultés techniques et organisationnels qui en 
découleront.
• Granularité mal adaptée. Le déploiement d’applications largement distribuées nécessite un 
choix de granularité approprié afin d’assurer la facilité de gestion et la soutenabilité de la 
solution finale. Une granularité non appropriée peut avoir un certain nombre de conséquen-
ces, entre autres:
• Problèmes de déploiement de l’infrastructure cryptographique: Le non déploiement 
d’une infrastructure à clés publiques globale est souvent cité comme la source d’un 
grand nombre de problèmes de sécurité propres aux transactions Internet. Dans ce tra-
vail, nous proposons comme alternative un déploiement orienté-domaine comme li-
gne directrice couplée avec le caractère incrémental de la distribution de paramètres 
cryptographiques.
• Absence de contrôle des flots encryptés. Une transaction encryptée impliquant deux 
utilisateurs finaux situés dans deux domaines organisationnels distincts va transporter 
des informations qui, par la résistance cryptanalytique des algorithmes utilisés, sera 
uniquement visible par les entités possédant les clés correspondantes de cryptage/de-
cryptage. Par conséquent, les contrôles perimetriques mis en place par les organisa-
tions impliquées ne seront pas en mesure de réaliser les contrôles de contenu perti-
nents en vue de détecter des éventuelles menaces qui seraient transportées par les 
transactions encryptées. L’approche présentée dans ce travail, proposant le remplace-
ment des clés de granularité fine des utilisateurs finaux par des clés basées domaine - 86 -
2  Introduction à la Notion de Domaines Collaborateurspermet de préserver la protection cryptographique entre les organisations impliquées 
sans renoncer aux contrôles de contenu perimetriques.
• Niveau d’abstraction approprié pour les problèmes relatifs à la gestion d’applica-
tions. Lorsqu’on traite des informations de gestion, le choix d’un niveau de granula-
rité non approprié rend difficile les taches d’analyse, diagnostique et réparation aussi 
bien pour la gestion d’équipements physiques que pour la gestion d’applications dis-
tribuées complexes.
2 Introduction à la Notion de Domaines Collaborateurs
Les structures de domaine existent dans un grand nombre de situations propres au monde informa-
tique. Entre autres et selon leurs différentes applications, nous trouvons de domaines de gestion, 
des domaines de sécurité, des domaines de routage, des domaines administratifs, etc. L’idée der-
rière la structure de domaine se base sur l’identification des éléments d’un ensemble, présentant 
des caractéristiques communes selon des critères bien spécifiés (géographiques, fonctionnels, sé-
curitaires, etc.). Une fois identifiés, ces éléments sont enveloppés sous une structure de domaine 
afin de faciliter l’encapsulation et l’application de politiques communes. 
En allant un pas au delà de cette définition classique, ce travail prétend définir un cadre de 
collaboration entre le domaines ainsi crées. La nature et les détails de cette collaboration vont cer-
tainement varier avec les différentes catégories de domaines. Voici une liste non exhaustive des ac-
tions de collaboration que nous envisageons pour le catégories abordées dans cette thèse de docto-
rat:
• Domaines de gestion: La collaboration entre ce type de domaines a comme but principal 
d’effectuer des opérations de surveillance, d’analyse et de résolution de problèmes. P.ex.: 
observer et quantifier le trafic réseau, détecter des problèmes de connection entre deux sites 
distants, diagnostiquer le comportement suspect d’une application, élaborer une description 
concise de l’état d’une application distribuée, etc.
• Domaines de sécurité: Une collaboration active entre deux (ou plusieurs) domaines de sé-
curité distincts peut être nécessaire pour détecter des intrusions. Par exemple, le comporte-
ment d’un logiciel malveillant peut dépendre d’un ensemble de sous-programmes exécutés 
dans des domaines différents. Seule la collaboration entre les domaines moyennant la cor-
rélation des informations réussira à établir la nature et l’étendu de la menace. Un autre do-
maine d’application dans le cadre de la sécurité consiste à établir des clés de sécurité basées 
domaine pour échanger des informations encryptées entre les bords du domaine de manière 
complètement transparente aux utilisateurs finaux et sans supporter le coût du déploiement 
à granularité fine.- 87 -
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Distribuées
En vue d’introduire le cadre de collaboration des domaines, nous allons détailler quelques concepts 
nécessaires à la réalisation de cette collaboration. Ces concepts, propres à la gestion d’applications, 
ne se retrouvent pas dans les solutions de gestion classiques, à savoir, les protocoles de gestion 
d’équipements matériels ou de réseaux physiques. Ils sont les suivants: 
• Model enrichi d’information de gestion: Le modèle d’information propre aux protocoles 
de gestion classique (basé sur des Management Information Bases ou MIB) n’est pas appli-
cable à notre cadre de gestion d’applications. Afin d’améliorer l’analyse et le diagnostique 
propres à ce cadre, le modèle d’information doit être capable de distinguer:
• Information homogène et hétérogène.
• Information générique et spécifique.
• Information concise et précise.
• Distribution de la fonctionnalité de gestion: La vue classique d’un gestionnaire (mana-
ger) et d’un agent proche du système doit être étendue pour les applications distribuées en 
vue d’obtenir une fonctionnalité de gestion mieux adaptée. En particulier nous distinguons 
les environnements fonctionnels suivants:
• Gestion de la plate-forme d’exécution
• Gestion propre à l’application
• Gestion propre au module dans son ensemble
Afin d’intégrer ces concepts dans notre cadre de domaines collaborateurs, nous proposons une ar-
chitecture précise appelée Distributed Management Tree (DMT) que nous décrivons ensuite.
3.1 Le Distributed Management Tree (DMT)
Le DMT est un ensemble de noeuds structurés en une arborescence hiérarchique et distribuable. 
Chaque noeud représente une entité active dans l’évaluation de l’état du système sous surveillance. 
Tous les noeuds collaborent et travaillent dans le même but de mener à bien les tâches de diagnostic 
et de réparation. - 88 -
3  Domaines Collaborateurs dans la Gestion d’Applications DistribuéesLa figure 1 montre succinctement le fonctionnement d’une branche du DMT et ses deux 
flux principaux, à savoir, le flux informationnel et le flux fonctionnel:
3.2 Domaines Collaborateurs: Questions Topologiques
Dans la figure 1, nous avons montré la décomposition proposée entre les entités de gestion active 
(managers) et les entités sous gestion (agents). Il convient de remarquer le caractère dual de ces 
noeuds du DMT.
Logiquement, la topologie des domaines collaborateurs sera directement déterminée par 
celle de l’application sous gestion. Par exemple, si deux domaines de gestion souhaitent analyser 
le nombre excessif de messages échangés entre deux relais de courrier électronique, il devront si-
tuer la collaboration au niveau du DMT adapté à l’analyse relative du trafic. Par contre si le pro-
blème concerne l’absence de connectivité entre deux relais, il faudra placer la collaboration à un 
niveau plus bas de l’arbre, à savoir, proche de la configuration réseau des équipements impliqués.
3.3 Domaines Collaborateurs: Types d’Interactions
La définition du modèle de collaboration nécessite la description du type d’interactions qui auront 
lieu entre les différents domaines. Nous distinguons deux types de collaboration:
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Part V   Résumé en Français• Collaboration passive où l’interaction se limite à un échange d’information entre les deux 
domaines de gestion. Il peut s’agir d’information de haut ou de bas niveau selon le contrat 
de collaboration. Par exemple, cette catégorie permettrait à un domaine de répondre à la 
question, "est-ce que ton trafic est normal?" ou "quel est le pourcentage de transactions re-
jetées dans tes serveurs?"
• Collaboration active où les domaines intervenants sont autorisés à déclencher des actions 
spécifiques dans les domaines voisins pour autant que le contrat de collaboration le permet-
te. Plusieurs types d’exécutions sont possibles, à savoir, des routines prédéfinies activées 
par des "push buttons", des mécanismes à la RPC (Appel de procédure à distance), l’exé-
cution conjointe et synchronisée entre les différents domaines impliqués et l’exécution de 
scripts à distance(1).
Les collaborations se déroulent dans un cadre de sécurité approprié avec une authentification basée 
sur des clés de domaine ainsi que sur une politique bien définie de droits d’accès à l’information et 
aux capacités fonctionnelles. On remarque que le degré de confiance entre les participants est es-
sentiel pour déterminer le genre de collaboration à mettre en place. En particulier, les collabora-
tions à haut risque, comme celles permettant des exécutions à distance, devront être soumises à des 
limitations sécuritaires très strictes ainsi qu’à des environnements d’exécution contrôlés.
3.4 Scénarios Pratiques
Nous avons mis en place un scénario pratique de détection de boucles dans les échanges de courrier 
électronique afin d’illustrer ces concepts. Nous avons étudié également d’autres cas comme la con-
nectivité au niveau applicatif.
4 Domaines Collaborateurs dans les Transactions Sécurisées
Les causes fondamentales qui sont à l’origine de l’échec du déploiement global des services de sé-
curité dans les transactions Internet sont les suivantes:
• Absence d’une infrastructure de certification global.
• Problèmes relatifs au déploiement et à la gestion de clés à granularité fine.
• Complexité au niveau de l’utilisateur final.
Les grandes lignes des solutions envisagées dans ce travail se concentrent en trois groupes princi-
paux, à savoir: recommandations structurelles, enrichissement des fonctionnalités des autori-
1 Dans le but de valider cet aspect de la collaboration active et lors d’un projet de recherche FNRS, nous avons 
développé un outil nommé PERLRex permettant l’exécution à distance de scripts PERL dans un environne-
ment contrôlé.- 90 -
4  Domaines Collaborateurs dans les Transactions Sécuriséestés de certification (y compris la collaboration entre elles) et interventions des domaines colla-
borateurs.
Nous allons esquisser chacun de ces sujets dans les paragraphes suivants.
4.1 Recommandations Structurelles
Un des problèmes principaux dont souffre l’infrastructure actuelle de certification est le manque 
de synchronisation entre le réseau de certification (celui qui relie les certificats et les autorités de 
certification) et le réseau principal (là où se placent les utilisateurs et où ont lieu les transactions 
et les liens de confiance). Ce manque de synchronisation a comme conséquence directe que les cer-
tificats qui traduisent la confiance cryptographique et qui délivrent l’identité digitale ne sont pas en 
correspondance parfaite avec les liens de confiance réels ni avec le cadre dans lequel s’exécutent 
les transactions supposées sécurisées. La figure 2 montre ce dédoublement entre les deux réseaux 
et indique les opérations qui permettent de faire évoluer les états dans les deux cas.
Le caractère hors-ligne (off-line) des autorités de certification (elles servent comme support 
direct mais ne participent pas directement aux transaction sécurisées) est la principale raison de ce 
manque de synchronisation. Il se peut, par exemple, qu’un certificat soit authentique (c.a.d. qu’il 
ait été signé avec la clé privée légitime de l’autorité de certification) mais qu’il ne soit pas actuel 
si, par exemple, une révocation a été générée entre-temps dans le réseau de certification sans que 
ce fait se soit répercuté dans le réseau principal. Ces deux notions d’authenticité et d’actualité sont 
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Part V   Résumé en Françaisessentielles pour comprendre la plupart des protocoles de sécurité et sont d’ailleurs amplement uti-
lisées dans des logiques formelles de validation comme la logique BAN.
4.2 Enrichissement des Fonctionnalités des Autorités de Certification
En poursuivant le raisonnement sur ces problèmes de synchronisation des deux réseaux précédem-
ment décrits, ce travail s’est concentré dans une série d’analyses et d’améliorations fonctionnelles 
portant sur la infrastructure de certification. Premièrement, nous avons développé une métrique ap-
pelée latency metric qui nous permet de quantifier le lapse de temps écoulé entre la révocation ef-
fective du certificat d’un utilisateur A et le moment où cette révocation est disponible pour un uti-
lisateur B du réseau principal. Ce lapse de temps est d’autant plus grand que la chaîne de certifica-
tion reliant les autorités de certification de A et de B est longue.
Nous proposons également dans cette thèse de doctorat la délégation de la tâche de valida-
tion d’un certificat vers l’autorité de certification. Le concept de base de toute Infrastructure à Clés 
Publique (coramment appelée PKI pour l’acronyme anglais) est que l’utilisateur est responsable de 
la validation du certificat de son correspondant. Lorsque cette transaction a lieu sous le domaine de 
responsabilité d’une seule autorité de certification, la validation n’est pas problématique. Mais 
comme on le montre avec notre métrique, la question se complique lorsque les chemins de certifi-
cation deviennent longs et complexes.
A titre de comparaison, nous esquissons l’exemple des algorithmes de routage dans des ré-
seaux très vastes comme l’Internet où les entités intermédiaires (les routeurs et indirectement, les 
domaines auxquels ils appartiennent) collaborent afin de trouver un chemin optimal pour achemi-
ner les paquets. Le modèle du routage tel qu’on le conçois de nos jours serait impraticable s’il fonc-
tionnait en mode peer-to-peer, c.à.d. si les entités finales devait à elles seules calculer ces routes 
optimales.
En approfondissant cette idée de l’intervention active des entités intermédiaires, nous pro-
posons un modèle formel de collaboration entre les entités de certification qui distingue entre les 
collaborations synchrones (l’information sur les certificats et les listes de révocation est échangée 
à des intervalles réguliers) et asynchrones (les notifications hors- séquence, indépendantes des pé-
riodes fixées, font partie du modèle).
Nous analysons également en détail le contenu des collaborations et définissons un format 
"type" des paquets échangés ainsi qu’une sémantique décrivant le contenu de ces paquets. En par-
ticulier, nous proposons un certificat nommé state certificate (certificat d’état actuel) qui décrit de 
manière exacte le statut courant de l’autorité de certification ainsi que les données propres aux col-
laborations où elle est impliquée. Il faut également souligner la notion du paquet forwardable qui 
permet de tenir compte des liens transitifs entre les différentes autorités de certification et de créer 
ainsi des contrats de collaborations qui correspondent aux chemins de certification croisés classi-
ques.- 92 -
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Dans le cadre des domaines collaborateurs, et en vue de faciliter le déploiement des paramètres de 
sécurité (les clés publique et/ou certificats) à grande échelle, nous avons créé une infrastructure qui 
permet d’établir des transactions sécurisées inter-domaine avec des clés basées domaine (coarse 
granularity). Les extensions end-to-end sont effectuées avec des clés à granularité fine mais gérées 
de manière locale (intérieure au domaine), ce qui facilite le déploiement et la gestion de ces clés. 
La figure 3 montre de manière générique l’infrastructure proposée (par soucis de clarté les compo-
sants principaux ne sont pas traduits):
A partir de cette architecture de base, nous présentons l’exemple d’une transaction sécurisée en uti-
lisant des clés basées domaine. En particulier nous analysons l’authentification et la confidentialité 
inter-domaine et end-to-end d’une transaction du type store-and-forward.
Nous proposons également une version basée sur les domaines collaborateurs du protocole 
d´établissement de clés(1) Station-to-Station.
1 Un protocole d’établissement de clés permet d’établir une clé de session authentique actuelle et normale-
ment confidentielle à partir de secrets de longue durée (par exemple une clé privée) détenus par les entités qui 
participent au protocol.
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Pendant ces dernières années et en parallèle avec la réalisation de cette thèse de doctorat, l’industrie 
informatique a subi un grand nombre de transformations très significatives. Le domaine de la sé-
curité réseaux, un des axes principaux de ce travail, a joué un rôle fondamental dans ces transfor-
mations tout en devenant le centre d’attention des media et de l’opinion publique en général.
Cette période a vu le nombre et l’importance des attaques destinés aux systèmes d’informa-
tion et aux réseaux publiques comme l’Internet, augmenter de manière dramatique. Le profile des 
attaquants a également changé de façon très significative. On est passé du hacker éventuel cher-
chant la satisfaction personnelle ou la notoriété publique aux cyber-criminels organisés visant des 
activités d’espionnage de tout genre ou des intérêts économiques bien ciblés. Les chiffres sont ter-
rifiants: 55 millions de victimes potentielles de vol d’identité digitale en 2007 seulement aux Etats 
Unis, des trous de sécurité permettant le vol de millions de numéros de cartes de crédit, des attaques 
de type phising capables de subtiliser les clés d’accès à des clients e-banking et en fin, le fait que 
la cyber-criminalité est devenue une affaire plus lucrative que le trafic de drogues ou d’armes pour 
les organisations terroristes.
D’un point de vue exclusivement technique, les algorithmes cryptographiques sont devenus 
plus robustes et soumis à l’analyse exhaustive des experts dans la matière (AES), les protocoles de 
sécurité ont surmonté leurs défauts de jeunesse et la sécurité de l’information est devenue une dis-
cipline mature rassemblant un grand nombre de professionnels hautement qualifiés.
La question que nous devons nous poser en tant que spécialistes expérimentés du domaine 
de la sécurité est "qu’avons nous donc fait faux?" Si nous analysons les détails internes des attaques 
mentionnés précédemment nous découvrons un fait marquant: aucune de ces attaques nécessite de 
casser un algorithme cryptographique pour aboutir. Parmi les causes, on trouve des techniques de 
programmation défaillantes, l’insuffisance de contrôles système ou réseau et, surtout, l’absence 
d’une infrastructure de certification fiable capable d’assurer la distribution à large échelle de ser-
vices de sécurité comme l’authentification forte ou la confidentialité cryptographique.
Lorsque je pense à mes premiers pas dans le domaine de la sécurité, je me rappelle d’avoir 
été interpellé par les inconsistances du tout premier standard de certification X.509. A cette époque 
déjà j’étais complètement persuadé que ce standard ne se réaliserait jamais à grande échelle. Le 
temps m’a donné raison. Depuis ce moment, mes intérêts de recherche se sont consacrés à amélio-
rer le capacité de déploiement des services de sécurité et à la gestion d’applications largement dis-
tribuées. D’où les deux grands axes de cette thèse de doctorat.
Finalement, je voudrais insister sur le fait que conjointement aux activités de recherche et 
d’enseignement dans le cadre universitaire, ce travail est le résultat d’une longue expérience de tra-
vail de terrain aussi bien dans les secteur académique que corporatif. J’espère sincèrement que les 
développement ici présentés feront avancer l’état de l’art dans ce domaine complexe mais fasci-
nant.- 94 -
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